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Does nancial globalisation increase inequality? Should households with little nancial
wealth still hold foreign assets? Are consumption patterns of low income earners more
dispersed than those of the rich? Do aggregate savings rise or fall when a society becomes
more unequal?
These are some of the questions I raise in this thesis. Its central theme is the role of
individual heterogeneity in an international economy, with a focus on idiosyncratic risks
and income inequality within countries. This allows me to look at some well-recognised
policy issues from a new angle, such as the fall in the US current account, which I argue
could be in
uenced by changes in the structure of domestic income inequality. But the
combination of the individual with the international level of analysis also enables me
to ask new questions, for example whether wealthier households are less biased towards
domestic assets in their portfolio decisions than poorer households, and why this could
be. The thesis can thus be understood as an attempt to link two literatures that have
largely remained separate in the past: that on imperfect domestic risk-sharing, on the
one hand, and the international economics literature on the other. This is especially
true for chapters 1 and 2. They build on the analysis in chapters 3 and 4, which
concentrate on an economic environment where risk-sharing is imperfect because agents
cannot commit to honour nancial contracts, and analyse the resulting equilibrium and
its characteristics in a closed economy.
Chapter 1 looks at global imbalances. It is motivated by the fact that, since the 1980s,
the US has not only seen a signicant fall in its net foreign asset position, but also a
strong rise in domestic inequality and the volatility of incomes. I show how the second
fact might help explain the rst, against the intuition from simple buerstock savings
models. The key to the result is what I call "endogenous nancial deepening": more
volatile income makes individuals less inclined to default on nancial contracts as this
triggers exclusion from future nancial trade. The consequences of this improvement in
individual incentives after an increase in risk are similar to an increase in the economy's
viii




aggregate borrowing capacity. But interestingly, higher risk has very little impact on
consumption inequality, which is determined mainly by international interest rates. The
chapter shows these results both analytically and in a quantitative example. For the
analytical part, it uses a small open economy version of the standard limited commitment
model. For the quantitative results, it builds on the model by Krueger and Perri (2006)
calibrated to the US economy, to show the eect of changes in income risk on net foreign
asset positions in partial equilibrium. But I also analyse the general equilibrium of a
two country economy, calibrated to the US and China. In both environments, the rise
in income risk observed in the US since the early 1980s causes a strong fall in its net
foreign asset position.
Chapter 2 is about home bias in portfolios. Rather than looking at aggregate country
portfolios, however, it focuses on portfolios of individual households, and how they dier
along the wealth distribution. That wealthier households hold a larger fraction of their
portfolio in risky assets has been well-documented in the household nance literature.
The chapter uses data from the US Survey of Consumer Finances to document that
wealthier households also hold on average a higher share of their wealth in foreign
assets. This relative home bias of the poor does not seem to be explained by xed
participation costs alone, as the portfolio share of foreign assets increases with nancial
wealth even among participants in foreign asset markets. The chapter then shows how
both biases of poorer agents' portfolios, towards safe and home assets, can arise in a
simple two country economy with income and portfolio heterogeneity. Poor investors are
naturally biased against domestic equity when wages and capital returns are positively
correlated, making equity a bad hedge against 
uctuations in labour income relative to
bonds. Home bias in consumption, on the other hand, leads to a bias against foreign
assets in the bond portfolio.
Chapter 3 takes a more detailed look at the structure of heterogeneity in the limited com-
mitment model, where nancial contracts can only be enforced by the threat of exclusion
from future nancial trade. Its main theoretical contribution is to prove existence and
uniqueness of a closed economy stationary equilibrium when incomes follow a standard
markov process, and to solve analytically for the joint distribution of consumption, in-
come and wealth. I show how the asymmetric nature of partial insurance under limited
commitment, where negative income shocks are pooled but positive shocks can lead to
large idiosyncratic jumps in consumption, implies a characteristic form of non-linearity
and heteroscedasticity, with declining conditional variances as income increases. In a
quantitative part, the paper compares the exact joint distributions in the Krueger and
Perri (2006) model to non-parametric estimates of their counterparts in US micro-data,
and in a simple Ayagari economy.




The nal chapter of the thesis starts from new evidence on the response of consumption
to permanent and transitory income shocks in US micro-data, presented recently by
Blundell et al (2008). They discuss their main nding, excess smoothness in the reac-
tion of consumption to permanent income shocks that has declined with rising income
volatility, in the context of limited commitment models and their nancial deepening
eect of rising income risk. The chapter analyses this link formally. In a simple version
of the model, I derive the response of consumption to income shocks in closed form,
including an expression for the upward bias of Blundell et al's estimator in this environ-
ment, where their identifying assumption of no history dependence in consumption is
violated. I then compute the response of consumption to income shocks in the calibrated
limited commitment economy presented by Krueger and Perri (2006). In their original
calibration to the US economy, consumption responses to permanent shocks are an or-
der of magnitude smaller than in the data. But the introduction of a limited amount of
heterogeneity in discount factors brings the model roughly in line with the data. In both
calibrations, however, the upward bias of Blundell et al's identication scheme leads to
estimates about twice as large as the true value of the coecients.
The chapters are self-contained and can be read as individual papers, in any order. This
leads to some repetition in the description of the environments, and comes with some
dierences in notation across chapters, to which I would like to alert the reader.




Domestic or global imbalances?
Rising inequality and the fall in
the US current account
Abstract1
This chapter shows how the rise in individual income risk in the US since the 1980s might
help explain the fall in its foreign asset position. The key to this result is endogenous nancial
deepening in an open economy with participation-constrained domestic nancial markets. More
volatile income makes individuals less inclined to default on nancial contracts as this triggers
exclusion from future nancial trade. Lower incentives to default, in turn, increase the insura-
bility of income shocks, thus lowering the need for precautionary savings. My theoretical results
show that, contrary to the case of unconstrained complete markets, individual participation-
constraints guarantee a well-dened stationary equilibrium at a given world interest rate. Based
on an analytical solution to the stationary consumption distribution, I show that higher income
risk can lower mean consumption and aggregate asset holdings. Consumption inequality, on the
other hand, is almost entirely determined by the level of world interest rates, and remains largely
unaected by changes in income risk. A quantitative exercise shows that the observed rise in
individual income risk in the US since the 1980s can explain a signicant fall in net foreign assets.
JEL Classication Codes: D31, D52, E21, F21, F41
Keywords: Current Account, Global Imbalances, Heterogeneous Agents, Inequality,
Incomplete Markets, Participation Constraints, Default
1I would like to thank Dirk Krueger, Assaf Razin, and seminar participants at the Econometric
Society's European Winter Meetings 2008, the 2009 EER Young Talented Economists Clinic, Normac
2009, as well as at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the ECB, Ente Einaudi, IIES, Queen
Mary University of London, the Swiss National Bank, and the Universities of Bern, Bonn, Cambridge,
Carlos III and Warwick, for helpful comments.
1
Broer, Tobias (2009), Heterogeneous Individuals in the International Economy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/13714Chapter 1. Domestic or global imbalances? 2
1.1 Introduction
Over the past 25 years, the US has experienced a signicant rise in both cross-sectional
income inequality and the uncertainty of individual incomes. Simple economic models
suggest this should have increased individual savings at the same time as consumption
inequality. But instead, during the same period, US savings fell, current account decits
accumulated to about 40 percent of 2004 GDP, while consumption inequality increased
only little. Since 2007, while current account decits narrowed, the declining value
of the relatively risky US foreign investments increased the US net liability position
further, thus reinforcing concerns about its sustainability. This chapter shows how, in an
open economy, a rise in individual income risk can actually lower the aggregate foreign
asset position, while leaving consumption inequality largely unchanged. The crucial
assumption is that individuals have access to complete domestic insurance markets, but
also the option to default on contracts, at the price of permanent exclusion from nancial
trade. This restricts transfers under the insurance scheme to amounts that individuals
nd optimal to pay, rather than choose the outside option of default. Higher income risk
increases individuals' incentives to remain insured and thus to honour contracts, which
is equivalent to a nancial deepening in the economy. Under these \debt-constraints"
to complete domestic risk-sharing, I analyse the eect of changes in income risk on
consumption volatility and aggregate savings in an open economy. I analytically show
that, for a given world interest rate, an increase in income risk can lower the mean
of the stationary consumption distribution, thus decreasing the amount of stationary
assets, while leaving relative consumption inequality unaected. Also, I develop a new
algorithm based on the associated planner's problem as in Marcet and Marimon (2009),
to show quantitatively that the observed rise in individual income risk in the US between
1980 and 2003 can explain a signicant fall in net foreign assets.
Figure 1.1 shows the large and, until recently, increasing US current account decit
since 1980. Understanding the reasons for the corresponding rise in foreign indebted-
ness is important, mainly because dierent explanations have dierent implications for
its sustainability. For example, it has been argued that the fall in US net assets is a
necessarily temporary phenomenon, linked to a strong rise in US house prices, that will
eventually have to unwind (see e.g. Roubini et al 2004, Roubini 2005). Other authors,
however, have attributed at least a part of this fall to changes in the structure of the
world economy that imply a permanently lower US net asset position. Thus, Mendoza
et al (2007) have focused on the impact of capital account liberalization in countries
whose domestic nancial markets are less developed relative to the US. In their model,
once capital markets are liberalized, higher precautionary savings and lower appetite
for risk in the rest of the world result in capital 
ows to the US concentrated in bonds,
Broer, Tobias (2009), Heterogeneous Individuals in the International Economy 
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Figure 1.1: US current account and Gini coecients. Source: IMF and Brandolini et
al (2007)
in line with the evidence. However, the underlying comparative advantage of deeper
domestic nancial markets in the US is exogenous to the model. In another contribu-
tion, Fogli and Perri (2006) show how the relatively more important reduction in US
macro-volatility since 1980 implies a stronger reduction in the buerstock savings of a
representative US consumer than in other countries. But crucially, while international
asset trade is limited to non-contingent bonds in their model, they assume domestic
trade of a set of complete state-contingent assets that warrants the focus on represen-
tative national agents. This assumption, however, has been largely rejected by the data
(see for example Zeldes (1989)). Moreover, as gure 1.1 shows, while US debt increased,
cross-sectional domestic income inequality rose strongly, partly attributable to a rise in
the uncertainty of individual incomes (see Krueger and Perri (2006), and more recently
Heathcote et al (2008b)). And in the absence of perfect domestic risk-sharing, these
changes in income risk will aect aggregate debt dynamics.2
This chapter analyses net asset positions in a simple open economy model that relaxes
the assumption of a representative agent, and does not assume exogenous comparative
nancial advantage. Instead, it makes the depth of domestic nancial markets depend
endogenously on the riskyness of individual income. This allows me to look at the im-
pact of changes in idiosyncratic income and consumption risk on aggregate savings and
2Cabellero et al (2006) also have a model of global imbalances, based on a lower capacity to generate
nancial assets from real investments in the rest of the world, relative to the US.
Broer, Tobias (2009), Heterogeneous Individuals in the International Economy 
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asset positions. But importantly, it also allows me to analyse the eect of international
variables, such as interest rates, on individuals' decisions and, ultimately, the domestic
consumption distribution.
If non-contingent debt was the main savings vehicle of the economy, as in Fogli et al
(2006), an increase in individual income risk would yield a rise, not a fall, in equilibrium
savings, together with higher consumption volatility. On the other hand, in an economy
where domestic markets are complete, but individuals can default on contracts at the
price of permanent exclusion from nancial trade, the relationship between income risk
and consumption volatility is known to be less simple. Krueger and Perri (2006) show
that under this assumption of participation-constrained complete markets, a rise in in-
come risk has two osetting eects: rst, it raises the income realizations of individuals
who receive positive shocks, and thus, for a given upper limit to redistribution, increases
the volatility of consumption. But higher income risk also makes the outside option of
nancial autarky, where it translates one-to-one into higher consumption volatility, less
appealing. This second eect acts to increase the insurability of income shocks, and
thus deepens nancial markets and reduces consumption volatility. Krueger and Perri
(2006) show that the latter, nancial deepening eect becomes more important for high
levels of income risk, causing consumption volatility to rst rise and then fall as income
risk increases. Aggregate savings mainly act as a precaution against this consumption
volatility.
This chapter shows analytically that the open economy setting breaks the closed economy
link between consumption risk and precautionary savings. Particularly, relaxing individ-
ual debt constraints leaves relative consumption inequality largely unchanged. Rather, it
can be interpreted as an increase in the country-wide borrowing capacity that leads to an
increase in stationary debt holdings, or a fall in the net asset position. To derive these re-
sults, I rst show that, unlike with unconstrained complete markets, a debt-constrained
economy that faces a given world interest rate has a unique stationary equilibrium that
does not depend on initial conditions. So individual participation-constraints \close
small open economies" (Schmidt-Groh e et al 2003). As shown in Broer(2009b), the
optimality conditions of an associated planner's problem, as in Marcet and Marimon
(2009), allow me to solve analytically for the stationary consumption distribution even
with standard, independent Markov processes for the incomes of a large number of
individuals. The stationary equilibrium has the interesting feature that consumption
follows a geometric distribution whose shape depends largely on the world interest rate,
while its position is determined by participation constraints. Thus, looser participation
Broer, Tobias (2009), Heterogeneous Individuals in the International Economy 
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constraints increase aggregate debt holdings and decrease aggregate consumption in sta-
tionary equilibrium. However, as mentioned above, the eect of higher income risk on
participation-constraints depends on the initial level of income risk, and therefore the
particular economy under analysis. A second part of the chapter thus looks at the US
example, and evaluates the eect of the observed rise in US income volatility on its net
foreign asset position and the consumption distribution quantitatively. The analysis is
comparative static in nature, as I abstract from transitions and focus on steady states
associated with the level of individual income risk in the early 1980s, on the one hand,
and the higher volatility of incomes observed more recently, on the other. The exercise
should ideally account for changes in income heterogeneity in both the US and its main
economic partners during this period. Unfortunately, comprehensive cross-country data
on the evolution of income risk are as yet unavailable, and in some cases unfeasible.3
Comparative studies of simpler inequality measures have found that, apart from the
United Kingdom, other OECD countries have experienced less important increases in
income inequality since 1980 than the US (see e.g. Brandolini et al 2007). To focus on
the open economy eect of the relatively large changes in income heterogeneity in the
US, I rst analyse their eect at an exogenously given world interest rate.4 In a second
exercise I analyse a two country general equilibrium model where the US trades bonds
with a large developing country with less sophisticated domestic nancial markets. To
capture the change in income risk, I use the stochastic process of individual incomes in
the US estimated by Krueger and Perri (2006) for the years 1980 and 2003. For the sec-
ond country I choose a process in line with the observed change in inequality in China.
To solve the model, I develop a new algorithm based on Marcet and Marimon (2009) to
compute the stationary consumption distributions and net asset positions. The results
show that the increase in income risk in the US can indeed explain a signicant part
of the fall in the net foreign asset position, both at a given interest rate as well as in a
general equilibrium exercise.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 describes the environment of
an open economy with debt-constrained domestic nancial markets. Section 1.3 derives
the analytical results on the basis of the associated planner's problem. Section 1.4
reports the computational algorithm and quantitative results. An appendix contains
most proofs.
3Thus, in the UK, for example, household panel data have been collected only since the beginning
of the 1990s. However, Heathcote et al (2008b) is one paper in a recent project to compare measures of
individual inquality and income risk across countries. See http://www.econ.umn.edu/ fperri/Cross.html.
4The assumption of an exogenous interest rate has also been made in contributions concentrating
entirely on the domestic consequences of increases in individual income volatility in the US. See for
example Heathcote et al (2008a).
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1.2 An open economy with debt-constrained domestic -
nancial markets
This section presents a simple model of an open economy where domestic nancial
markets are constrained by individual default, and denes the competitive equilibrium.
1.2.1 Agents, countries, time
The economy consists of an individual country and a rest of the world. The theoretical
analysis focuses on the individual country and assumes that it takes prices of goods and
assets traded with the rest of the world as given. A later quantitative section, however,
also looks at the example of a 2 region world economy.
The small country is populated by a large number of individuals of unit mass. Indi-
viduals are indexed by i, located on a unit-interval i 2 I = [0;1]. Time is discrete
t 2 f0;1;2;:::;1g and a unique perishable endowment good is used for consumption.
1.2.2 The endowment process
The consumption endowment of agent i in period t, zi;t, takes values in a nite set Z:
zi;t 2 Z = fz1 > z2 > ::: > zNg;N  2. Endowments follow a stochastic process
described by a Markov transition matrix F. F has strictly positive entries, is identical
across agents, monotone (in the sense that the conditional expectation of an increasing
function of tomorrow's income is itself an increasing function of today's income), and
has a unique ergodic distribution Z : Z ! [0;1], where Z is the power set of Z. Thus, in
the long-run, aggregate income Y =
R
I zi is constant, while individual income 
uctuates.
Let st denote the state of the economy in period t, a vector containing individual incomes
and asset holdings of all agents.
1.2.3 Preferences





where Es0 is the mathematical expectation conditional on s0, 0 <  < 1 discounts future
utility, ci;t is consumption by agent i in period t, and u : R+ ! R is an increasing,
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strictly concave, continuously dierentiable function that saties Inada conditions and
is identical for all agents in the economy.
1.2.4 Asset markets
I choose a specication of the economy similar to that by Alvarez and Jermann (2000),
amended for the international setting. Agents engage in sequential trade of a complete
set of state-contingent bonds domestically, but international asset trade is limited to
non-contingent bonds.5
Individual endowment realisations are veriable and contractable, but asset contracts are
not completelely enforceable: at any point, individuals can default on their contractual
payments at the price of eternal exclusion from nancial markets. Thus the total amount
an agent can borrow today against any income state zj tomorrow is bounded by the
option to default into nancial autarky. There, consumption is forever equal to income.
Given the markov structure of income, the value of default as a function of the vector




(F)tU(z) = (I   F) 1U(z) (1.2)
I denote holdings of bonds and Arrow-Debreu securities paying o in state st by b and
a(st) respectively. In any state st, V (z(st);a(st);bt) is the contract value as a function
of income z(st) and current asset holdings fa(st);btg.
As in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) individual i's participation constraint for any state
st+1 tomorrow can be written as a constraint on the claims she can issue against st+1 in-
come. This borrowing constraint is \not too tight" in the words of Alvarez and Jermann
(2000) if it assures participation but does not constrain contracts otherwise
ai(st+1) + Rbi;t+1  Ai(st+1) = minf(st+1) : V (zi(st+1);(st+1;0))  W(zi(st+1))g (1.3)
Note that bonds are redundant in this setting, although including them facilitates the
setup of the planner's problem in an open economy where aggregate bond holdings,
denoted B, are potentially non-zero.
Importantly, the portfolio constraint (1.3) limits the issuance of assets that demand
net repayments in high income periods, when the outside option of default is most
attractive. On the one hand, this reduces transfers from high to low income individuals
under insurance contracts. But on the other, it denes a maximum level of debt that
5This is non-restrictive as there is no aggregate risk and the law of large numbers holds. It requires,
however, no default on foreign debt on a country level. In a previous version of this chapter I show
that Broner and Ventura's (2006) result applies to my setting. Thus, perfect secondary markets prevent
governments from defaulting on agents' foreign liabilities.
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individuals, and thus the country on aggregate, can sustain. The attractiveness of
default during periods of high individual income, determined by the value of the outside
option of nancial autarky W, is thus the main determinant of the aggregate net asset
position in stationary equilibrium. The next section brie
y considers how W is aected
by changes in income risk.
1.2.5 Income risk and the value of default
Under the assumption that default leads to exclusion from all nancial transactions,
the value of default equals the expected utility of individual income streams given by
(1.2). The assumption of monotonicity of both utility and transitions ensures that these
autarky values are increasing in the level of current income. However, the relationship
between autarky values and income risk is more dicult to characterise. Particularly, a
change in risk can come via changes in transition probabilities F, via a change in the
support of endowments Z, or both. In this chapter, I follow Kehoe and Levine (2001) and
dene a rise in risk as a mean-preserving spread to the income support Z. This, however,
does not imply mean-preserving spreads to the conditional income distribution for all
individuals. Rather, given persistence, it raises (lowers) current and expected future
income for today's high (low) income earners. So for low levels of uncertainty, higher
risk increases both expected income and autarky values for the income-rich. However,
although their expected income continues to rise, as a consequence of concave utility
the prospect of negative shocks weighs more heavily on expected utility as higher risk
decreases income, and thus consumption, in low income states. Given Inada conditions,
this eect necessarily outweighs the gain in expected income at some point. Thus,
autarky values of high income individuals roughly follow an inverse U-shape relation
with income risk. So we would expect portfolio constraints to rst become tighter, and
then loosen, as income risk rises. The analytical part of this chapter shows that this is
indeed the case. The quantitive section shows the location of a model calibrated to the
US economy on this \Laer curve" of default incentives.
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1.2.6 The household's problem
In every period, households maximise their expected utility by choosing current con-
sumption and assets subject to budget and borrowing constraints







a(st+1)q(st+1) + bt+1  Rbt + a(st) + z(st) (1.4)
a(st+1) + Rbt+1  A(st+1) (1.5)
As shown in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) this problem has a recursive representation as




a(s0)q(s0) + b0  Rb + a(s) + z(s)
a(s0) + Rb0  A(s0)
A(s0) = minf(s0) : V (z(s0);(s0);0)  W(z(s0))g
where c;b0;a0 are policy functions of the state variables (z(s);a(s);b).
1.2.7 Denition of competitive equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium in this economy is a set of asset prices q(s0);R, a set of
individual decision rules c;b0;a0(s0) with associated value functions V (z;a;b)
such that
1. V (z;a;b) is the households maximum value function associated to the household
problem given q(s0);R
2. V (z;a;b) is attained by c;b0;a0(s0)
3. Markets for state-contingent assets clear
R
I ai(st) = 0; 8st;t
4. The interest rate on bonds is equal to the world interest rate R.
The competitive equilibrium is called \stationary" if prices and aggregate bond holdings
are constant, and the distribution of individual consumption is stationary through time.
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1.3 Analytical properties of the consumption distribution
and aggregate savings in stationary equilibrium
In this section I show analytically how, unlike with unconstrained complete markets,
individual participation constraints ensure the existence of a stationary equilibrium in
an economy that faces a given world interest rate smaller than its agents' rate of time
preference. I show how across stationary equilibria, a rise in income risk can leave
consumption inequality unchanged, but decreases aggregate asset holdings if the initial
level of income risk is high enough. Also, I show that market completeness does not help
the most unfortunate individuals in this economy: both their current consumption and
expected value from future consumption are the same as without any nancial markets.
Insurance, however, reduces the number of individuals in this situation signicantly.
To derive these results I exploit the constrained ecient nature of the economy that
allows me to solve the associated planner's problem as in Marcet and Marimon (2009).
In chapter 3 I use this method to show existence of equilibrium, and to solve for the
joint distribution of consumption, income and wealth, in a closed economy version of
the model. Here I build on these results to show how, in an open economy, changes in
income risk aect mainly the position of the consumption distribution, while its shape
is a function of world interest rates. An increase in income risk can decrease net foreign
assets by making default less attractive and thus relaxing, eectively, the economy-wide
borrowing limit. To illustrate this, I then focus on a version of the economy with two
income values. This is a case previously analysed in Krueger and Perri (2005), Krueger
and Uhlig (2006), and Thomas and Worrall (2007), under the additional assumption of
i.i.d. transitions for income. Here I use the results in chapter 3, where I derive a closed
form solution to the distribution in the case with persistence and CRRA preferences, to
show analytically the eect of changes in individual risks on aggregate assets in an open
economy.
1.3.1 The planner's problem and rst order conditions
Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that a version of the rst welfare theorem applies to
the closed economy version of this environment. The small open economy assumption
changes aggregate feasibility constraints but, together with an appropriate No-Ponzi
condition, leaves this result intact. This allows me to focus on participation-constrained
ecient allocations. More particularly, I exploit the results in Marcet and Marimon
(2009), and focus on the solution to the participation-constrained social planner's prob-
lem.
Marcet and Marimon (2009) show how the ecient competitive equilibrium allocation
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solves the following planner's problem. For a given bounded measurable weighting func-






problem of the planner is to distribute resources optimally subject to individuals' par-











ci;t + Bt+1 =
Z
I
zi;t + RtBt; 8t





where the planner's maximum value VV is a function of i;0, the initial distribution of
multipliers induced by i;0, and aggregate bond holdings B0. Vi;t denotes the expected
value of the consumption sequence the planner gives to agent i starting in period t, and
the last line is a No-Ponzi condition on aggregate bonds B, which I assume to be 0 in
period 0. Also, I assume that i;0 only takes a nite number of values.
Note that the problem in (1.6) is not recursive in the cross-sectional distribution of in-
come. Intuitively, the planner optimally provides an increase in value Vi;t to participation-
constrained individual i by an increase in both current and future consumption. But
this requires the planner to keep her consumption promise even if individual i receives
a negative income shock tomorrow. The solution thus has potentially innite history
dependence. But Marcet and Marimon (2009) show how, based on the Lagrangian as-
sociated to the sequential planner's problem, this history-dependence can be encoded
in a time varying value of individual welfare weights i;t. In particular, the assump-
tions on i;0, utility and transition probabilities ensure that the problem is suciently
well-behaved to have a saddle-point representation that is recursive in a time-varying
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i corresponds to the multiplier on i's participation constraint in the sequential
problem (1.6). Note that the weights of individuals in the social welfare function are
now updated every period to meet participation constraints.7 And when 
i is zero, so i is
unconstrained, (1.8) ensures promise-keeping by the planner. Intuitively, by increasing
multipliers the planner allocates a higher than expected consumption path to constrained
individuals with positive income shocks, to keep them \happy" with the contract. The
absolute weights of the remaining, unconstrained individuals are constant, but decline
relative to those for individuals with positive income shocks. This leads to a gradual
decline in consumption for these individuals until they either receive a positive income
shock, or reach the level of constant consumption that, given prospects for future shocks,
just meets the participation constraint corresponding to their income level. The solution
of the planner's problem is a sharing rule   : Z R+ ! R+2 that maps current weights
i and income shocks zi into consumption ci and new weights 0
i = i + 
i.









Thus, since U0(c) is decreasing, individuals with a higher weight receive higher consump-
tion. Also, from the rst order condition for aggregate bond holdings, the interest rate
is tied to the ratio of the multipliers , associated to the aggregate feasibility constraint
6To see this, note that the initial weighting function i;0 only takes a nite number of values, and
that for every t < 1 the set of possible income histories Z
t is nite and bounded. So the exogenous state
space is the Euclidian Product of a countable number of compact sets, and thus, according to Tychono's
theorem, compact. Also, given the No-Ponzi condition, aggregate bond holdings are bounded and thus
lie in a convex compact set, implying that feasible consumption allocations are just a simplex, and thus
a convex set, every period. With concave utility, the constraint set is therefore compact and convex,
and non-empty since autarky is feasible and incentive-compatible. The problem thus fullls conditions
A1 to A5 in Marcet and Marimon (2009), and therefore has a recursive saddle-point representation. For
further detail, see the proof of uniqueness and existence in the Appendix.




is a function of current income and the past value of i only. So, given my assumption of a nite support
of i;0, the number of individual multipliers remains countable.
8Note that continuously dierentiable utility and a convex constraint set imply that the value function
is dierentiable. Also, Inada conditions and the concavity of the utility function imply that the rst
order conditions, together with participation constraints, are sucient to characterise the optimum.
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where the second equality exploits the absence of aggregate uncertainty and the law of
large numbers,9 and the third uses the intratemporal optimality conditions for consump-
tion. Importantly, the interest rate determines the slope of marginal utility for those




Given monotonicity of U0, this provides a law of motion for the consumption of uncon-
strained agents. With CRRA preferences u = c1 






So the lower R, the faster falls consumption of unconstrained agents. With CRRA
preferences we can simplify equation (1.10) further by solving for ci in terms of the














Thus, a fall in the world interest rate either lowers aggregate consumption growth, or
increases average growth in individual multipliers, or both. The rst eect is stan-
dard and leads to non-existence of a stationary equilibrium in small open economies
with unconstrained complete markets. The second eect comes from the participation-
constrained nature of risk-sharing. It implies, for example, that unless there is perfect
insurance (
i = 0;8i), the equilibrium closed economy interest rate is below the time
preference rate, a result well-known from Alvarez and Jermann (2000). More generally,
binding participation constraints increase the shadow value of future resources rela-
tive to today's. This is because current consumption only relaxes today's participation
constraints. Future consumption relaxes all previous participation constraints, includ-
ing today's, via the increase in continuation utility under the contract. So when more
agents hit their participation-constraints every period, or when a given set of binding
9Since the state space is nite every period, the assumption of independent shocks over a continuum








Zfi;tg IIt;z where I;z is the indicator function of the set fi : i = ;zi = zg and IIt;z 2 [0;1]
is the mass of individuals with weight  and income z in period t. So we can replace integrals with
summation over countable sets. Given the continuum of agents i 2 I, this ensures that the law of large
numbers applies. So the joint distribution of income and weights  tomorrow is known today. On the
law of large numbers in economies with a continuum of agents and independent idiosyncratic risk, see
Uhlig (1996).
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constraints becomes more binding, the planner reallocates aggregate consumption to
the future. Below I show that this second eect ensures the existence of a stationary
equilibrium in this economy.
Note that if
U0(z1)
U0(zN) > 1, (1.10) immediately yields a minimum interest rate Rmin > 1
below which all individuals simply consume their endowments. This is because, when-
ever 1 < R < Rmin =
U0(z1)
U0(zN), there are no participation-compatible unconstrained
transitions in (1.11). So individual consumption is simply equal to individual income.
1.3.2 Existence, uniqueness and stationarity of equilibrium
The closed economy version of this economy is one of the examples discussed in Marcet
and Marimon (2009). An appendix proves that the planner's problem has a unique
solution also at a given interest rate 1
 > R > 1. However, in both cases, we do
not know if this solution is stationary in terms of the long-run behaviour of aggregate
consumption and its distribution across individuals.
For example, in a standard small open economy with complete domestic markets that
are not participation-constrained, R < 1= implies that consumption levels are forever
declining. So no stationary solution exists. With participation constraints, however, this
is not an equilibrium, as the total value that the planner can distribute to individuals
declines with the level of aggregate resources. A permanently downward sloping path
of aggregate consumption thus necessarily violates individual participation constraints
at some point in the future. Instead, in an equilibrium with participation constraints,
the aggregate consumption decline slows down as participation constraints become more
binding. This is because for given weights i+
i, individual contract values decline with
aggregate resources. This requires stronger increases in relative weights of participation-
constrained indivdiuals 
i. But more binding participation constraints increase the
marginal value of future resources according to equation (1.10). This slows the decline
in aggregate consumption until it settles down at a stationary level, with a corresponding
stationary distribution of individual consumption and aggregate debt holdings. Equation
(1.13) shows how the individual consumption volatility, expressed there as growth in
average individual planner weights, eectively replaces the non-stationarity of aggregate
consumption. In this way, individual participation constraints provide an additional way
of \closing small open economies" (Schmidt-Groh e et al 2003).
In the resulting unique stationary equilibrium, consumption in all states is pinned down
by participation constraints and the law of motion of unconstrained agents (1.11) given
the exogenous interest rate R. The following section uses a closed form example to
illustrate the characteristics of the stationary distribution of consumption, and to show
how aggregate foreign assets in this stationary equilibrium are eectively determined
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by individual income risks. To do this, I rst show how, for a given interest rate R,
the position of the consumption distribution moves up and down with autarky values.
Then I show how the latter follow an inverse U-shaped relationship with income risk,
and what this implies for foreign asset holdings.
1.3.3 A closed form example
Consider an economy in which the income process described in the previous section
takes only two values fzh;zlg = fy0 + 1
;y0   1
1 g;   0, where  =
1 q
2 q p is the
stationary mass of high-income individuals, for transitions given by F = [p;1 p;1 q;q].
Monotonicity and absolute continuity require 0 < 1 q < p < 1. Also, I assume income
has persistence which is not too dierent in high and low income states:
p;q > 1=2 (1.14)
   1





I dene a \marginal rise in income risk" as a small widening of the income support
d > 0. The specication of Z ensures that this is a mean-preserving spread for all
values of p;q, and thus leaves aggregate resources unchanged.
This example is a generalisation of that considered, in an economy with capital, by
Kehoe and Levine (2001), or more recently by Krueger and Perri (2006), who, however,
assume independent transitions.
1.3.3.1 The stationary consumption distribution
Remark 1.1. There exists a unique stationary equilibrium with a distribution of con-
sumption C : C  R+  ! [0;1]. If 1 < R < Rmin, the stationary distribution of
consumption is equal to that of income, so C = Z;C = Z. If Rmin < R < 1=, C is
(c1) =
1   q
2   q   p
=  (1.16)
(cij1<i<m) = (1   p)qi 1 (1.17)
(cm) = (1   )qm 1 (1.18)
Broer, Tobias (2009), Heterogeneous Individuals in the International Economy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/13714Chapter 1. Domestic or global imbalances? 16
for
c1 = f
(1   )(1   q(R)
1 
 )
1 + (1   p   q)(R)
1 




1   (p + q)   2(1   p   q)
1   q








;1 < i < m










This closed form of the consumption distribution is proved in detail in chapter 3. To see
that it is bounded below by zl, note that an individual at minimum consumption cm is
necessarily constrained today and tomorrow (from stationarity and minimality of cm).
So cm is determined from her participation constraint
Wl = U(cm) + [(1   q)Wh + qWl] (1.21)
which is solved by cm = zl = y0   1
1  by the denition of Wl.
An individual in the high income state is always constrained. To derive her consumption
c1, express the expected value of her consumption stream under the contract as an innite
sum of lotteries with two outcomes: either, she receives value Wh. Or, in case of a low
income realisation, she receives (R)
i 1
 c1; i = 1, plus participation in the next lottery
for i = 2, and so forth until hitting cm = zl, where she remains until a high income
shock. The discounted sum of the values of these lotteries must be equal to Wh   u(c1)
which denes c1, and thus, by (1.12) the rest of the support.10
The stationary mass at c1 is equal to that of high income individuals . The remaining
mass function (c1+i) is simply  times the probability to move to low income and
stay there for i < m periods, which yields a geometric distribution with parameter q.






























g + (1   q)Wh]g
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This closed form solution of the distribution is a useful building block for characterise
the relationship between aggregate debt and income risk in the following section.
1.3.3.2 Income risk and aggregate debt in stationary equilibrium
This section shows how an increase in the riskyness of incomes lowers aggregate assets in
this economy, as long as the initial level of risk is high enough. Remark 1.1 shows that
changes in income risk d aect the stationary consumption distribution only via shifts
in its upper and lower bounds, through changes in autarky values Wh;Wl. Stationary
assets, which nance the dierence between the constant aggregate endowment and
aggregate consumption, inherit these comparative statics of consumption with respect
to . This yields the following proposition
Proposition 1.2. There is a value , such that for higher initial levels of income risk
 > , a marginal increase d > 0 decreases stationary asset holdings.
Proof
By summing over the distribution in remark 1.1, we can write aggregate consumption
as11









Thus aggregate consumption is aected by income risk only via changes in the bounds of
the consumption distribution. In particular, C is decreasing in income risk  whenever
c1 is, which in turn, from remark 1.1 depends on autarky values Wh and Wl. These are
Wh =
(1   q)u(y0 + 1
) + (1   p)u(y0   1
1 )
1   (q + p)   2(1   (q + p))
(1.25)
Wl =
(1   q)u(y0 + 1
) + (1   p)u(y0   1
1 )
1   (q + p)   2(1   (q + p))
(1.26)
Given the assumptions on transition probabilities, Wl is always declining in , while
the high income-autarky value Wh is concave in  with a maximum at some  > 0.
11If (cm)  0, such that truncation of the geometric distribution is negligible (which is true necessarily
as R  ! 1=), we have
c1 = f
(1   (p + q)   
2(1   p   q))(1   q(R)
1 
 )
(1 + (1   p   q)(R)
1 




and aggregate consumption equals
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It increases for  < , decreases for  >  and crosses the perfect insurance value at
 > .12 Note that this result does not depend on CRRA preferences. So for  > 
aggregate consumption declines with income risk . Stationary aggregate assets are
monotonously increasing in aggregate consumption, so the result follows.
1.3.3.3 The decoupling of income and consumption inequality in open econ-
omy
The following result shows that in an open economy facing a given world interest rate,
the inequality of consumption can become completely independent from that of income.
Corollary 2: Variance of log-consumption
If (cm)  0, the variance of log-consumption is




where  > 0 is a function of transition probabilities only. So (log) consumption inequality
is entirely determined by world interest rates R, where a higher R lowers domestic con-
sumption inequality. If there is a non-negligible mass at the truncation point, (cm) > 0,
this is an upper bound for the cross-sectional variance of individual consumption.
For the simple algebra that leads to the result see chapter 3. The intuition is straight-
forward: Income risk aects the stationary distribution of consumption mainly via the
participation constraint at high income that determines its upper bound, and thus the
position of the distribution. Apart from the truncation at zl, the shape of this distribu-
tion, however, depends entirely on the value of interest rates R, via the law of motion
(1.12). Therefore, international interest rates determine consumption inequality, while
income risk determines mean consumption, and thus asset holdings.
12To see this, take the rst derivative of autarky values with respect to 
dW
d
















The persistence assumptions assures that for  = 0 the rise in current utility dominates the fall in future
expected utility for high income agents. With strictly positive entries of F, however, Inada conditions
on u translate to Wh, so marginal utility goes to innity as the low income realisation goes to zero:
as   ! y0,
dWl
d  !  1. By the intermediate value theorem and continuity, there exists an  with
dWh()
d = 0, and  >  with Wh() = 0. Also, for twice continuously dierentiable u the concavity of
the utility function translates to the concavity of autarky values as a function of 
dW
2

















)] < 0 (1.28)
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1.3.4 Income risk, aggregate debt and consumption inequality with
general uncertainty and preferences
Proposition 3.6 naturally generalises to the case N > 2 with well-behaved, non-CRRA
preferences. To see this, note that in this case, the consumption distribution can be
characterised by N minimum participation-compatible consumption levels, associated
to N autarky values, that provide the upper bounds for geometric sub-distributions.
Within these subdistributions, the support is entirely determined by the law of motion
(1.11), and monotonously increasing in the upper bounds. So when a rise in income risk
reduces all autarky values, the whole support of consumption declines, reducing aggre-
gate consumption and asset holdings in stationary equilibrium (for detail see chapter 3).
The shape of the n sub-distributions is again independent of the upper bound, with vari-
ance that decreases in R. However, changes in income risk now change relative autarky
values and thus do not move the subdistributions in parallel. So the shape of the overall
consumption distribution is not independent of income risk. But it is easy to show that
the width of the support C decreases with R.
Chapter 3 also proves existence and uniqueness of stationary equilibrium in a closed
economy version of the model. There, the results on the shape of the consumption
distribution continue to hold, while the comparative static eect of changes in income
risk does not. Consumption thus follows a geometric distribution, implying a signicant
left skew. Equilibrium interest rates are relatively low in the endowment version of the
model, at about 2.5 percent.
1.3.5 Saving after default
Although the characterisation of the consumption distribution and its implications for
aggregate debt hold conditional on any value of default, proposition 3.6 depends crucially
on the Laer curve-type relationship between income risk and autarky values, implying
that, for high enough levels of risk, autarky values fall and debt constraints are relaxed
when income risk rises further. The analytical characterisation of the relation between
income risk and autarky values at the basis of this Laer-curve, in turn, required the
assumption that agents simply consume their income forever after default. This assump-
tion, however, may be viewed as too strong, as individuals should have access to some
storage, or savings technology to transfer resources between periods even after exclusion
from complete nancial markets.
The possibility to save in high income periods makes the outside option of default sig-
nicantly more attractive, as individuals can guard against the risk of very low con-
sumption implied by temporary negative income shocks without saving. Rather than
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with the level of default values, however, this study is concerned with their behaviour
after changes in income risk that determines the evolution of the economy's aggregate
borrowing capacity. Trivially, for low enough interest rates, the above Laer-curve re-
lationship holds also when agents can save after default, as for low R, savings become
increasingly unattractive and agents thus simply consume their income after default.
For intermediate interest rates, however, the impact of increasing risk on autarky values
is less clear. It is easy to see that, for unchanged expected income, a rise in risk lowers
the value of the outside option even with saving at a given interest rate. Since, however,
a rise in risk, in this paper, is dened as a mean-preserving spread to the support of the
income distribution, high-income individuals, who are those with binding participation
constraints, experience a rise in expected income. With saving, this rise in expected
income can continue to dominate the negative eect of increasing risk that holds at
any given amount of lifetime resources. The following, quantitative section therefore
discusses the sensitivity of its results to allowing individuals to smooth consumption by
saving even after default.
1.4 Individual risk and global imbalances: income uncer-
tainty and the US net foreign asset position 1980-2003
The previous section showed that in an open, debt-constrained economy, rises in income
risk can lower aggregate savings and asset positions. But importantly, this only holds
for an initial level of income risk that is suciently high. The sign and importance of
the eect of changes in income risk on asset positions thus depends on the particular
economy under analysis. Also, the independence of stationary consumption inequality
from income risk only holds for the special case with two income values, at a given
exogenous interest rate. Thus, this section rst analyses a partial equilibrium version of
the model that is calibrated to match some stylised features of the US economy in the
years 1980 and 2003. Specically, I use the stochastic process for US individual incomes
estimated by Krueger and Perri (2006), and compare debt holdings and consumption
inequality in stationary equilibria corresponding to the two endpoints of their sample,
respectively 1980 and 2003. A second exercise analyses the General Equilibrium of a
stylised 2-country economy, where the US trades bonds with a large developing country,
calibrated to capture the evolution of individual income inequality in China. There,
I assume domestic asset trade is limited to uncontingent assets, resulting in a rise of
precautionary savings in response to an increase in individual income risk. Before turning
to the results I brie
y describe the calibration of the model parameters.
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1.4.1 Calibration
I calibrate the income process following Krueger and Perri (2006), using their estimates
for the years 1980 and 2003, the endpoints of their sample. The authors assume the
log of post tax labour income plus transfers (LEA+) log(zt) to be the sum of a group
specic component t and an idiosyncratic part yt. The latter, in turn, is the sum of
a persistent AR(1) process mt, with persistence parameter  and variance 2
m, plus a
completely transitory component "t which has mean zero and variance 2
".
The process for LEA+ is thus of the form
log(zt) = t + yt
yt = mt + "t





Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), the authors rst partial
out the group-specic component t as a function of education and other variables,
identifying the variance of the idiosyncratic part of income yt, as well as (from the short
panel dimension of the CEX) its rst order autocorrelation. They then x  = 0:9989,




The results show an increase in the variance of labour income of 18 percentage points
between 1980 and 2003, the two periods I focus on. 11 percentage points are due to an
increase in within-group inequality, out of which roughly two thirds are accounted for by
an increase in the importance of persistent shocks, and one third by that of transitory
shocks.
In my exercise I abstract from changes in the common wage rate and dierences in the
group specic component, which, in the present model as in that of Krueger and Perri,
translate fully into consumption dierences by construction.
As a baseline calibration, I choose a CRRA utility function with coecient of relative
risk aversion of 1 (log-preferences), a discount factor of 0:96, and a constant interest
rate equal to the initial closed economy equilibrium rate of 3.4 percent. I then look at
the sensitivity of the results to changes in parameters, and the world interest rate. And
I look at the case when agents who default are excluded from all nancial transactions
in the current period, but allowed to invest in non-contingent bonds in the future to
smooth income shocks over time. This reduces the impact of higher income risk on the
value under default.
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1.4.2 Model Solution
To solve the model, I rst approximate the persistent process for mt with a 7-state
Markov chain using the standard Tauchen and Hussey (1991) method.13 Following
Krueger and Perri (2006) I choose a binary process for the transitory shock. The com-
putational algorithm then follows chapter 3, which describes the recursions to derive the
stationary consumption distribution in the general case. I amend this for the fact that,
with purely transitory shocks t, the monotonicity condition for F does not hold.
1.4.3 Partial equilibrium results
1.4.3.1 Income risk and net foreign assets
Table 1.1 shows the equilibrium asset positions for dierent specications of the economy.
In the baseline calibration (I), the rise in income risk between 1980 and 2003 leads to a
fall in the stationary level of net foreign assets of more than 50 percent of annual GDP.
Table 1.1: Stationary assets and consumption inequality - dierent calibrations
I Baseline
year R   Assets/GDP Var(log(c)) Save in default?
1980 1.034 0.96 1 0 0.034 No
2003 1.034 0.96 1 -0.56 0.04 No
II Save in default
year R   Assetss/GDP Var(log(c)) Save in default?
1980 1.025 0.96 1 -0.04 0.07 At 2.5%, not in t=0
2003 1.025 0.96 1 -0.15 0.09 At 2.5%, not in t=0
III Save in default  = 2
year R   Assetss/GDP Var(log(c)) Save in default?
1980 1.025 0.96 2 -0.79 0.04 At 2.5%, not in t=0
2003 1.025 0.96 2 -1.23 0.05 At 2.5%, not in t=0
The table reports the results from 3 calibrations of the model, that dier in their punishment
of default, risk aversion and the exogenous interest rate. In calibration 1, agents who default
face complete nancial autarky, while in calibrations II and III they can smooth consumption
through saving, although not in the period of default.
However, this calibration features a relatively high world real interest rate, and very
strong eects of income risk on the value of default, due to the assumption of permanent
exclusion from all nancial trade. Thus, a second calibration allows saving in non-
contingent bonds starting from the period following default, and reduces the world
13Note that this method accords with my assumption of widening the support Z to increase risk, but
leaving the transition probabilities unchanged.
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interest rate to 2.5 percent.14 The results are reported as calibration II in table 1.1.
The fall in stationary assets from the observed rise in US income risk is now smaller,
at 11 percent of GDP. This is because with saving after default, higher income risk has
a smaller impact on autarky values. Calibration III in table 1.1 increases risk aversion
in this second calibration to  = 2. With more risk averse individuals, the income
volatility under nancial autarky provides stronger disincentives to default, even when
agents are allowed to save in autarky. For a given level of income risk, this translates
to lower stationary asset holdings. But as before, the increase in income risk between
1980 and 2003 decreases stationary assets further, by about 40 percent of GDP. Figure
Figure 1.2: Asset demand function, baseline calibration.
1.2 shows that this reduction in assets from a rise in income risk holds for all values
of world interest rates in the base line calibration. But this monotonicity of stationary
foreign assets in risk gets lost when agents are allowed to save under autarky, as gure
1.3 shows. For high interest rates, the additional increase in risk now increases aggregate
assets in stationary equilibrium.
1.4.3.2 Income and consumption risk
Figure 1.4 shows the consumption distributions in the baseline case, for low (1980)
and high income risk (2003). The sub-distributions, of dierent colour in the graph,
14I choose an interest rate on savings in autarky of 2.5 percent, which is close to the average ex-ante
annualised real rate of 2.6 percent on 6 month US treasury bills between 1980 and 2003, de
ated using
University of Michigan 12 month in
ation expectations.
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Figure 1.3: Asset demand function, log-preferences, saving after default at world
interest rate but not in t=0.
correspond to individuals that were last constrained in the same income state, and thus
have a common starting value for their declining paths before the next positive shock.
Importantly, these sub-distributions are geometric and their shape remains constant
between 1980 and 2003 - this is because the interest rate is unchanged in the baseline
case. Their positions, however, decline with the fall in autarky values caused by higher
income risk. This fall is less pronounced in states that correspond to positive realisations
of the binary transitory shock, such as state 1, as there, higher variance translates to an
increase in current income, if not value. From table 1.1 we see that the corresponding
change in the variance of log consumption is small.
Figure 1.5 illustrates the relationship between interest rates and the consumption distri-
bution. For the income process estimated for 2003, the gure shows how a lower interest
rate widens the consumption distribution signicantly, as analytically shown for the spe-
cial case above. Figure 1.6 conrms this nding: the change in consumption volatility
due to a change in income risk is an order of magnitude smaller than the changes caused
by movements in the world interest rate.
The rise in individual income risk observed in the US since the 1980s can thus potentially
explain at least part of the fall in its net foreign asset position. And interestingly, for a
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Figure 1.4: The consumption distribution in 1980 and 2003, baseline calibration (log-
preferences, no savings in autarky).
given interest rate this rise in income risk leaves the distribution of consumption almost
unaected. But changes in world interest rates have an important eect on consumption
inequality.
1.4.4 Endogenous nancial deepening meets the savings glut: A world
economy with rising idiosyncratic risk and dierences in nancial
development
So far, the analysis was agnostic about the determinants of savings outside the US, tak-
ing as given a world interest rate. But of course, in a closed world economy, the fall in
US savings caused by increased idiosyncratic risk aects the equilibrium interest rate.
This section thus looks at the general equilibrium in a simple economy consisting of 2
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Figure 1.5: The consumption distribution in 2003 (high income risk), with high and
lower interest rates.
countries that dier both in their domestic nancial market structures and the evolution
of idiosyncratic risk that their agents experience over time. In particular, I present a
stylised world economy consisting of China and the US. Both countries experience a rise
in idiosyncratic income uncertainty in line with their historical experience, but dier in
their ability to insure against this risk through domestic nancial trade. Specically, US
nancial markets are assumed to be complete but subject to participation constraints
as before, allowing individuals to save at the world interest rate after they default on
contracts. Chinese consumers, on the other hand, do not have access to complete do-
mestic nancial markets. Rather, I assume that individuals there can only engage in
self-insurance through trade in bonds subject to a borrowing limit. As before, I abstract
from aggregate risk. International asset trade is limited to non-contingent bonds, whose
prices all agents take as given. A stationary equilibrium of the world economy is thus
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Figure 1.6: Variance of log(c), baseline calibration.
a process for individual consumption in both countries, an aggregate net asset position
between the two countries and a market clearing interest rate.
The analysis concentrates on the eect of changes in idiosyncratic risk on equilibrium
net foreign asset positions over the last 25 years. The process of idiosyncratic risk in
the US is unchanged from the previous section. Unfortunately, equivalent estimates of
an income process with group-specic heterogeneity, as well as persistent and transitory
within-group risk, is infeasible for China, where the necessary household panel survey is
not available for the period of interest. We are thus left to estimates of cross-sectional
income inequality. This is a problem, as we cannot identify the dierent components of
individual income risk from cross-sectional data alone. But the calibrated model provides
a mapping from a specic income process to the cross-sectional consumption inequality
and a savings demand schedule. I thus calibrate the components of the income process
to capture the Gini coecients of consumption and income for Chinese urban regions
reported in Perlo and Wu (2005) in 1985, plus a zero initial foreign asset position. As-
suming that the income process in China has the same permanent-persistent-transitory
structure as in the US, including the persistence parameter of 0:9989, this provides three
targets for three parameters, namely the variances of the permanent, persistent and tran-
sitory component of the income process in (4.13).15 The increase in idiosyncratic risk
in China is then calibrated to capture the observed rise in both Gini coecients until
15For the permanent part of income risk, I choose a uniform distribution of log-income values with
5 support points, and calibrate the support width to capture the moments of the data. Also, for both
countries the results reported below are based on a discretisation of the AR(1) component of the income
process into a 5-state markov process.
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2001. For this, I assume that the change in permanent income dierences in China is
entirely captured by the rise of Urban-Rural inequality. But I look at the sensitivity of
the results to this assumption below. The results assume a relatively tight borrowing
limit corresponding to average quarterly income. As country weights, I use relative GDP
of both countries from the Penn World tables in 1980 and 2003.
Table 1.2: Calibration of the income process for China
permanent persistent transitory Gini income Gini consumption
1985 0.08 0.0038 0.03 0.19 0.17
2001 0.08 0.057 0.10 0.27 0.21
The table reports the variances of components of an income process for Chinese urban regions
that has the same structure as that reported in the text for the US: in the absence of information
on group-specic attributes, (between-group) permanent income dierences are modelled as a
log-uniform distribution with 5 support points, while within-group income risk is the sum of a
an AR(1) process with persistence parameter 0.9989 (discretized as a 5-state Markov process),
plus a purely transitory binary shock (see the text for details). The parameters are chosen to
target the Gini coecients for consumption and income from Perlach and Wu (2005) for urban
regions, and a zero net foreign asset position in 1980.
Table 1.2 reports the implied estimates of the income process in China. In line with
the similar Gini coecients for consumption and income, inequality in the 1980s is esti-
mated to be mainly determined by permanent income dierences: both the variance of
persistent and transitory income shocks are small. But the observed rise in consumption
and income inequality until the early 2000s, stronger for income than for consumption,
is in line with a strong increase in both the variance of persistent and transitory shocks,
by 5.4 and 7.0 percentage points respectively.
Figure 1.7 plots the resulting equilibria for the early 1980s and the early 2000s. Chinese
assets are plotted with a negative sign, such that the intersections of the demand and
supply schedules give equilibrium asset positions and interest rates. The initial net in-
terest rate of 2.5 percent is low relative to the discount factor of 0.96, as in many models
of imperfect insurance. The increase in risk in the US results in the familiar fall in the
savings demand schedule as a result of nancial deepening. But in China, the strong
rise in idiosyncratic risk after the early 1980s results in a strong rise in precautionary
savings. This is exactly as we would expect in a self-insurance economy, where the -
nancial deepening eect of higher income risk is absent, and the precautionary savings
eect is relatively strong. The corresponding net eect is a fall in the US net foreign
asset position to minus 32 percent of GDP, and a fall in the world interest rate of about
25 basis points.
As it is impossible to distinguish the eect on cross-sectional inequality of increases in
permanent income dierences from those of the very persistent shocks in the model,
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Figure 1.7: Asset demand and supply in a two country world economy.
The picture depicts US asset supply together with asset demand by China, which has
a negative sign.
Figure 1.8 was based on the assumption that increases in permanent income dierences
are entirely captured by the dierence between urban and rural regions. Since pre-
cautionary savings are largely unaected by changes in permanent inequality but rise
with persistent shocks to income, this may overstate the equilibrium savings. There-
fore, Figure 1.8 shows how the results change when I make the opposite assumption of
unchanged persistent shocks (which requires some recalibration also of the variance for
transitory shocks, to match both Gini coecients). As expected, the rise in equilibrium
US liabilities is lower, but at 20 percent is still sizeable.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter has looked at the link between domestic income uncertainty, consumption
inequality and net foreign asset positions in an economy where nancial markets suer
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Figure 1.8: Asset demand and supply in a two country world economy: sensitivity.
The picture depicts US asset supply together with asset demand by China, which has
a negative sign. The two scenarios for China correspond to dierent ways of splitting
the increase in income inequality between permanent inequality and near-permanent
shocks.
from enforcement constraints. Domestic nancial markets were assumed to be complete,
but constrained by individuals' option to default on contracts, at the price of permanent
exclusion from insurance markets. I showed that, contrary to economies with uncon-
strained complete markets, this economy has a well-dened stationary equilibrium for
any given world interest rate. An analytical solution to the cross-sectional consump-
tion distribution showed that higher income risk can indeed lower aggregate savings by
making the punishment of default, nancial autarky, less attractive, thus endogenously
\deepening" nancial markets. However, changes in income risk have only a small eect
on consumption inequality, which depends mainly on the international interest rate. A
calibration of the model to the US case showed that the changes in income risk observed
between 1980 and 2003 might indeed explain an important part of the fall in the net
foreign asset position. This holds not only at a constant world interest rate, but also in
the general equilibrium of a simple world economy where the US trades bonds with a
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country that has less sophisticated markets and experiences a strong increase in idiosyn-
cratic risk similar to that seen in China. The \glut" in precautionary savings there and
the endogenous nancial deepening in the US, both caused by rising idiosyncratic risks,
result in a signicant deterioration of the US net foreign asset position, and a small fall
in the world interest rates.
Future research should generalise this analysis in at least two directions: rst, one should
also take account of the change in aggregate macroeconomic risk, which declined over
the period of analysis. And second, an adequate equilibrium of the world economy
should not only take into account advanced countries with decits and emerging sur-
plus economies, but also countries like Germany or Japan, that experienced surpluses
yet have relatively developed domestic nancial markets. In this context, the model's
prediction of an inverse U-shape relationship between net foreign asset positions and
individual income risk is especially interesting.




The home bias of the poor: terms
of trade eects and portfolios
across the wealth distribution
Abstract1
Wealthier people generally hold a larger part of their savings in risky assets. Using the US Sur-
vey of Consumer Finances, I show that wealthier households also have a higher portfolio share
of foreign assets. This relative home bias of the poor does not seem to be explained by xed
participation costs alone, as the portfolio share of foreign assets increases with nancial wealth
even among participants in foreign asset markets. This chapter shows how both biases of poorer
agents' portfolios, towards safe and home assets, can arise in a simple two country economy with
income and portfolio heterogeneity. Poor investors are naturally biased against domestic equity
when wages and capital returns are positively correlated, making equity a bad hedge against

uctuations in labour income relative to bonds. Home bias in consumption, on the other hand,
leads to a bias against foreign assets in the bond portfolio.
JEL Classication Codes: F36, G11, E21, D11, D31
Keywords: Heterogeneous Agents, Home Bias, Terms of Trade, Inequality, Interna-
tional Asset Diversication, Portfolio Choice
1I would like to thank David Backus, Charles Engel, John Leahy, and Gianluca Violante for helpful
comments, as well as seminar participants at the Bank of England, the European University Institute,
Cornell University, and the 2008 La Pietra Mondragone Workshop. Also, I am indebted to Frederico
Cepeda at Morningstar for his generous help with US mutual fund data.
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2.1 Introduction
It is well-documented that household portfolios become more diversied as wealth in-
creases. Campbell (2006) and Guiso et al. (2003), for example, show that poor house-
holds are less likely to invest in risky assets. Equally, many authors have found that
aggregate country-portfolios have surprisingly low shares of foreign assets, the so-called
\home bias in portfolios puzzle" (see Lewis, 1997, for a summary of this literature). But
little attention has been devoted to the composition of individual household portfolios
between domestic and foreign assets, and its relationship to individual wealth.2 In the
empirical part of this chapter, I study the US survey of consumer nances (SCF) and
show that wealthier households also seem to invest on average a higher share of their
portfolio in foreign assets than those with lower nancial wealth.
A prominent explanation for this bias of poorer investors towards safe and home assets
relates to xed costs of participating in the markets for risky and foreign assets. Fixed
costs, however, cannot explain the relative home bias of the poor among participants
in foreign asset markets, for whom the xed cost is sunk. In the theoretical part of the
chapter, I show that without xed costs, agents with lower nancial wealth optimally
have a higher portfolio share of assets that hedge against 
uctuations in their future
income. Assuming returns to capital and labour are positively correlated, this leads to
a bias of poorer investors against equity. With home bias in consumption, however,
investors are also biased against foreign bonds, as these are a bad hedge against aggre-
gate productivity shocks at home. Wealthy investors, whose future consumption is less
dependent on income, care less about this hedging property than poor investors. There-
fore, equilibrium portfolios vary across the wealth distribution and poorer investors tend
to have a stronger home bias than rich investors.
The intuition for these results has similarities to Baxter and Jermann (1997) who show
that with income from non-marketable human capital, the optimal portfolio of assets
consists of two sub-portfolios, one completely diversied, the other designed to hedge
against volatility of human capital returns. I show that the hedging portfolio can be
dominated by safe domestic assets. And its importance relative to the diversied part of
the portfolio declines as total investor wealth rises. To derive the results, I consider a two
country model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous consumers that receive an
uncertain amount of a country-specic endowment good every period. I derive analytical
portfolio shares by assuming (as Cole and Obstfeld, 1991) that preferences over domes-
tic and foreign goods are unit-elastic, but allow for symmetric home bias in consumption.
2Hau and Rey (2008a, 2008b) take, in some sense, an intermediate step of looking at individual
mutual fund portfolios. They nd average home bias which is, at least in the US case, in line with that
found using aggregate data, but also report an important degree of heterogeneity between portfolios of
dierent mutual funds.
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The chapter combines three strands of literature. First, from studies of household -
nances, such as Campbell (2006) or Guiso et al. (2003), I take the stylised fact that
wealthier individuals have riskier and more diversied portfolios. Using the 2004 wave
of the survey of consumer nances, I illustrate how this is also true for the holdings of
foreign assets, whose portfolio share I show to increase with investor wealth. Second,
from the international macroeconomics literature I take the idea that general equilib-
rium terms of trade movements can be important determinants of optimal portfolios,
and show how this can lead to variation in portfolios across individuals within the same
country. And third, by including uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk within the two
countries of an otherwise standard model, I take a rst step to extend heterogeneous
agents models to the open economy.
My theoretical model is most related to previous contributions trying to explain the
home bias of country portfolios. While some authors have focused on the costs of
diversication, where high turnover in foreign assets points against important formal
investment barriers (Tesar et al 1995, Stulz 2005) but informational asymmetries may
play a role (Ahearne et al 2004), most studies have looked at the benets of diversi-
cation, and questioned the usefulness of identical, completely diversied portfolios as a
benchmark. For example, non-tradable goods, or a bias in consumption baskets towards
locally produced goods, introduce asymmetry in the standard 2-country model and im-
ply variation in portfolios across countries (see e.g. Stockman et al 1995). Similarly,
non-tradable risks, for example in returns to human capital, introduce country-specic
hedgeing terms in optimal portfolios (Baxter and Jermann 1997) that can lead to home
or foreign bias depending on the covariance of returns to labour and capital (Bottazzi
et al 1996).
Traditionally, the literature has focused on home bias in equities of aggregate coun-
try portfolios. However, empirically, there is also strong home bias in bond portfolios
(Tesar and Werner 1995, Burger and Warnock 2004). Moreover, recently Coeurdacier
and Gourinchas (2009) have pointed out the importance of bonds for hedging real ex-
change rate movements. They show that portfolios that also include bonds have very
dierent equity shares, which eectively become hedges against non-nancial income
risk. Almost no study, however, has looked at home bias in individual, as opposed to
aggregate country-level, portfolios. An exception is the work by Harald Hau and Helene
Rey (2008a,b), who analyse the equity portfolios of individual mutual funds in developed
economies. I go a step further and consider portfolios at the household level.
The model I consider takes three elements from the recent literature on aggregate home
bias - non-diversiable income risks, consumption baskets that are biased towards do-
mestic goods, and portfolios consisting, potentially, of both bonds and equity - and
adds another, idiosyncratic income risk and wealth dierences between agents of the
same country. This environment is rich enough to look at individual portfolios of bonds
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and equity, but also suciently simple to allow, together with a particular structure
of preferences, approximate closed form solutions to portfolio shares. It allows me to
show that the implications for the composition of individual portfolios across the wealth
distribution are consistent with the observed facts.
Section 2.2 analyses portfolio shares of foreign assets across the wealth distribution in
the 2004 wave of the SCF. Section 2.3 presents a simple two country two good economy,
denes the competitive equilibrium and derives the equilibrium terms of trade move-
ments. Section 2.4 contains the results on optimal portfolios and how they vary across
the wealth distribution.
2.2 Portfolios across the wealth distribution: evidence from
the 2004 SCF
Wealthier and more educated people are more likely to invest in risky assets. This is
well-documented for the US (see for example Campbell, 2006, for a review and an illus-
tration using the 2001 SCF data) and a number of European countries (see Guiso et al,
2003, and Carroll, 2002).
Equally, it is well-known that average country portfolios have surprisingly low shares
of foreign assets - the \home bias in portfolios puzzle". This has been interpreted as
a consequence of a more general \local bias" of household portfolios, which overweigh
local, regional, and national assets (see e.g. Campbell 2006). But compared to the
portfolio shares of risky assets in general, or of domestic equity more in particular, there
is very little evidence on the home bias of individual households and its determinants.
Campbell et al (2006) conclude for the case of Sweden that international diversication
possibilities exist, but are usually exploited only by wealthier individuals, who have a
higher share of investments in mutual funds (with an average portfolio share of 25 per-
cent for foreign assets). However, they provide no evidence on direct holdings of foreign
assets.
To document the evolution of foreign asset holdings across the wealth distribution, I
examine the 2004 wave of the US survey of consumer nances (SCF). This survey in-
cludes information on the US dollar value of households' holdings of \bonds issued by
foreign governments or companies" and \stock in a company headquartered outside of
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the United States".3 In order to control for indirect holdings of foreign assets, I in-
clude a measure of foreign assets held via mutual funds.4 I derive a measure of total
foreign asset holdings by summing to individuals' direct investments in foreign equity
and bonds the reported value of their mutual fund shares in US equity, bond and com-
bination funds multiplied by the average portfolio weight of foreign bonds and equity in
each type of fund.5 Figure 2.1 plots the resulting foreign asset portfolio shares (averaged
within every decile of the nancial wealth distribution to reduce noise) as a function of
individual nancial wealth.6 The gure shows that the portfolio shares of foreign assets
are monotonically increasing across deciles of the nancial wealth distribution. Richer
households thus seem to have lower home bias on average.7
The evidence presented in Figure 2.1, however, raises several questions. First, there are
at least two potential sources of error in the way I measures individual portfolios. One
arises from households under- or misreporting their foreign asset holdings. But since
there is evidence of variation in foreign asset shares across mutual funds at least for eq-
uities (Hau and Rey 2008a,b), another source of error is the use of average mutual fund
portfolios, which could lead to a bias in the results. An appendix argues that both kinds
of measurement error are likely to bias any positive relationship between portfolio shares
and nancial wealth towards zero. This is because o-shore investments for tax evasion
are likely to make underreporting more severe for foreign assets, and average mutual
fund portfolio shares are likely to under-represent the foreign asset holdings by wealthy
3Question codes x7638 and x7641. An obvious problem of this measure is that it does not refer to
non-dollar assets, but to assets issued by foreign issuers, in foreign currency and US dollars.
4In other words, I do not consider pension funds. One reason for this is that individuals' decisions on
pension fund investments are taken under a very dierent set of constraints compared to other investment
decisions. Also, most shares in pension funds are not actively managed as a part of regular portfolio
decisions. However, both these arguments do not apply to individual mutual fund investments.
5To my knowledge, these average portfolio shares of mutual funds are not readily available from
published sources. But Morningstar kindly provided data on portfolio shares of non-US assets for more
than 4700 US mutual funds, not including funds of funds. From this I calculated weighted averages for
portfolio shares of foreign bonds and equity for the three categories of funds for the year 2003. Since
equity (bond) funds seem to often not report zero foreign bond (equity) holdings, I made an adjustment
by setting missing observations to zero for all funds that reported portfolio shares summing to at least
99.5 percent. The resulting sample included around 2800 observations for shares of international equity
and slightly less for bonds. Using this sample, the average US equity mutual fund invested 17.1 percent
in foreign shares, while the average bond fund (disregarding funds of government / municipal bonds)
invested 3.6 percent abroad. Combination funds invested on average 10.7 percent in non-US assets.
6Both the deciles and the averages take account of the fact that the SCF oversamples parts of
the population, by applying the weights suggested by Kennickell (1999), and the multiple imputation
procedure used for the SCF. This is because, to eliminate inconsistencies and missing values, the SCF
imputes some values from the other information provided by a household. However, rather than simply
reporting one best guess for the imputed values, the SCF provides 5 draws per observation from the
distribution of the missing values conditional on observables.
7The portfolio shares of foreign assets are low relative to those calculated from aggregate US data.
Yet it should be kept in mind that the SCF measure of nancial wealth, the denominator of the ratio,
includes a large range of assets such as insurance contracts, liquid retirement funds, etc., while the
numerator only considers bonds and stocks held directly and via mutual funds. Also, the aggregate
shares of foreign assets in the country portfolio cannot directly be read from the graph. The ratios of
foreign to total assets of the implied weighted aggregate portfolio are 2.75, 4.08, 3.99 percent for bonds,
equities and their total respectively.
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Figure 2.1: Portfolio share of total foreign assets (decile average) across the nancial
wealth distribution
households' if these systematically choose mutual funds with higher foreign exposure. A
second question is whether the rise in average portfolio shares across the wealth distri-
bution could merely be due to a higher participation rate of wealthy individuals in the
foreign asset market, rather than a rise in individual portfolio shares of participants as
they become richer. One factor that could cause such a pattern is xed costs of entering
sophisticated nancial markets. An appendix presents a simple model that shows that
this implies a non-linear relationship between nancial wealth and participation, in the
form of a threshold value of assets below which individuals do not hold any foreign as-
sets. Optimal portfolios above the threshold value, however, would not be aected by
sunk xed costs. Thus, any variation in portfolio shares above the threshold value has
to be attributed to other factors.
Finally, one might suspect that nancial wealth simply captures the eects of other
important variables, such as education, age, or income, on portfolios. In this case we
would expect an analysis that controls for these variables to yield signicantly dierent
results.
In response to this, I perform a more formal econometric analysis. I estimate jointly
the probability of participation and the optimal portfolio share of participants with the
Heckman (1979) method, conditioning on other variables that were found to be impor-
tant for portfolio decisions of individuals in previous research. To be precise, I estimate
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the parameters of the following 2 equation system
SHARE =
(




H = a + b1AGE + b2COL + b3FIN2 + b4FIN3 + b5FIN4 + 2 (2.2)
Here, SHARE is the portfolio share of foreign assets, FIN is the SCF denition of gross
nancial wealth and INCOME is the sum of salaries, wages and income or losses from a
professional practice, business, limited partnership, or farming. H is an indicator variable
that captures the probability of participation in foreign asset markets. This probability
is a function of age, a dummy variable \COL" that equals 1 when the household head
holds a college degree, and a set of dummies FINx that capture nancial wealth, taking
the value 1 when total nancial assets of the household fall in the (weight-adjusted) xth
quartile. Only when H is above a threshold, normalised to 0, do agents participate in
foreign asset markets and we observe the variable SHARE, their portfolio share of foreign
assets. Conditional on participation the portfolio share is a function of income and
nancial wealth. The errors 1 and 2 are assumed to follow a joint normal distribution.
The equations are estimated jointly with full maximum-likelihood adjusted for sampling
weights. Identication is achieved by restricting the eects of nancial wealth to be
linear in logs in (2.1), and constant within quartiles in (2.2), which I take to be a proxy
for dierent possible participation thresholds.8 Results are reported in table 2.1, where
numbers in italics are standard errors.9
The eect of nancial wealth is signicant (at the 1 percent level) in both equations.
Ceteris paribus, individuals in the bottom quartile of the nancial wealth distribution
are least likely to invest in foreign assets. But after a jump in the likelihood of partici-
pation between the rst and second quartile, moving further up the wealth distribution
has much smaller, and non-monotonous eects. This is in line with a threshold value
of assets beyond which a rise in wealth does not systematically raise the probability of
participation. However, higher nancial wealth increases signicantly the portfolio share
of participants in equation (2.1), which cannot be attributed to xed costs. The eect
8I also estimated an alternative specication that included income quartiles in the participation
equation. While in the presence of xed costs of entering foreign asset markets we would expect nancial
wealth to determine the participation threshold and not income, current income could act as a proxy
for future nancial wealth. However, the income quartile dummies turned out to be insignicant, so I
excluded them from the nal specication.
9Again, an additional complication is the use in the SCF of multiple imputations for missing values.
To account for this, I estimate the same model for each of the 5 implicates separately and then aggregate
the estimation results. For the coecients and standard errors reported in table 2.1, I use the formulae
suggested in the SCF codebook (http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/oss/oss2/2004/codebk2004.txt).
For the 
2 value I report a simple average of the following individual values: 75.66, 70.18, 81.42, 69.49,
43.22.
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const AGE COL FIN2 FIN3 FIN4
-2.65 0.000 0.11 1.73 1.20 2.15
0.25 0.0016 0.045 0.27 0.29 0.26
No of obs 4519 Censored: 3378
2(2) 68.00
FIN is the SCF measure of total gross nancial wealth; INCOME the
sum of salaries, wages and income or losses from a professional practice,
business, limited partnership, or farming; AGE the age of the house-
hold head in years; FINx a dummy variable that takes the value 1
when nancial wealth falls in the (weight-adjusted) xth quartile of the
cumulative distribution; and COL a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the head of the household has a college degree. Numbers in italics are
standard errors.
of age on the probability of participation is insignicant, but college graduates have on
average a higher probability of investing in foreign assets. Finally, for participants the
eect of rising income on the portfolio share of foreign assets is insignicant.
This section has shown that individual portfolio shares of foreign assets increase with
nancial wealth. There is a signicant jump in the probability of participation in for-
eign asset markets between the rst and second nancial wealth quartiles, consistent
with xed participation costs. But xed costs cannot explain the signicant positive
relationship between portfolio shares and nancial wealth for participants. The next
section presents a simple model of the international economy, where general equilibrium
movements in the relative price of home and foreign goods can make home assets better
hedges against income 
uctuations, and thus lead to the observed pattern of portfolios:
poor individuals have a stronger taste for home bonds as in general equilibrium their real
payos hedge against volatile endowments, which are their dominant source of income.
2.3 A two country heterogeneous agents endowment econ-
omy
I consider an economy with two countries, home (H) and foreign (F). In each country
there is a large number of agents with unit mass. Individual agents are indexed by h, f
at home and abroad respectively. They live for two periods, and receive endowments of
a country-specic perishable good H or F.
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Agents' preferences are described by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with
constant relative risk aversion 
 over a Cobb-Douglas aggregate, as for example in Cole
and Obstfeld (1991)

















 > 1 (2.6)
where ck;I denotes consumption by agent k of good I and k 2 fh;fg. The assumption

 > 1 is in line with many studies on home bias. The assumption of identical Cobb-
Douglas preferences, on the other hand, is borrowed from Cole and Obstfeld (1991).
With  > 1
2 it implies identical bias in consumption towards home goods, and is necessary
for an approximate analytical solution to the model, as shown in detail below. More
generally, notation is as follows: capital letters H,F denote country-specic variables or
goods, small letters h,f denote individual variables that can vary across agents of country
H,F. First subscripts denote agents or countries, second subscripts goods. Second period
values of a variable x are denoted as x', its distribution as 	x.
2.3.1 Heterogeneity and uncertainty
Heterogeneity of agents within the same country comes from dierences in endowments.
More precisely, agents in country K receive individual endowments k;0
k of their specic
good in period 1 and 2 respectively. Initial endowments k are known at the beginning of
period 1 before agents choose consumption and portfolios. Income inequality in country




k, the endowment of individual k in period 2, is the product of two terms: an \individual
endowment share" e0




k  Y 0
K (2.7)
\Idiosyncratic risk" is given by the probability distribution of e0
k, the period 2 endow-
ment shares of individual k, which I denote 	e0
k . For simplicity I assume that second
period endowment shares are i.i.d. across agents within the same country and indepen-





k = 1. By the iid assumption and the law of large numbers this means the
sum of realised endowment shares is always 1 and aggregate period 2 output in country
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K simply equals Y 0
K.10
"Aggregate risk" is summarized by the probability distribution of Y 0
H and Y 0
F, the ag-
gregate endowments in period 2, denoted 	Y 0
H ;	Y 0
F . I assume that these are identically
distributed across countries and independent of individual random variables and each
other.





F)0  N( (e0
h;e0
f;Y 0;Y 0)0; ), where a hat denotes natural logarithms
b z = ln(z) and  is a diagonal matrix with entries Veh;Vef;V;V .
2.3.2 Incomplete asset markets and borrowing constraints
I impose the simplest structure of asset markets that allows me to analyse two kinds
of trade-os in optimal portfolios: the choice between safe and risky assets on the one
hand, and between home and foreign assets on the other.
Like Huggett (1993), agents trade \IOUs" that are in zero net supply and denominated
in domestic goods. These are \safe" assets in the sense that for 1 unit of H goods in-
vested today, IOUs in H always pay Rb
H units of good H next period (where \b" stands
for \bonds"). Equivalently, foreign IOUs pay Rb
F units of F goods.
In contrast to Huggett's (1993) economy, however, agents can also trade shares in na-
tional mutual funds, and are allowed to buy shares and IOUs from foreigners. Shares
are also in zero net supply, and risky in the sense that their payos are proportional
to the stochastic aggregate endowment. Thus the return on home shares is Rs
HY 0
H per
unit of H goods invested, equivalently for F. One obvious implication of the exogenous
incompleteness of asset markets is that individual claims to future endowments are non-
tradable, and that the resulting risk thus is non-diversiable.
I denote h's holdings of home and foreign IOUs by ab
h;H and ab
h;F respectively, and her
holdings of shares by as
h;H and as
h;F. Asset quantities are denoted in endowment goods
of the owner. So if h holds a portfolio ab
h;H;ab
h;F, she owns ab
h;H units of H IOUs and
ab
h;F
p units of F IOUs. I denote the vector of returns as R, the vectors of assets held by
individuals in H, F as ah;af, and the total value, in terms of their domestic good, of
their assets at the end of period 1 as ah;af.
I assume both IOUs and shares have zero default probability. Consistent with this,
agents can credibly promise to repay only in units of their income - so borrowing con-
tracts are always written in the endowment good of the issuer. This means agents can
issue only domestic assets, but invest both at home and abroad. One consequence of
the no-default assumption are individual borrowing constraints: agents in country K
10For the derivation of a law of large numbers for continuum economies, see Uhlig (1996).
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can only issue IOUs and mutual fund shares up to maximum amounts Bb
K;Bs
K. In par-
ticular, and similar to for example Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009), I assume that





















2.3.3 The household's problem
A typical home household h maximises expected lifetime utility by choosing in period
1 consumption and a vector of assets ah subject to her budget constraint, borrowing
constraints for domestic assets and the non-negativity of foreign asset holdings, taking
as given the relative price of foreign goods (in units of the home good) p this period and










































H; for i 2 fb;sg
a
j
h;F  0; for j 2 fb;sg
0
h = e0Y 0
H
where pH =  (1 ) (1 )p1  is the home consumption price index. The problem of
a typical foreign household is symmetric.
11The \natural" limit to total borrowing in riskless assets would equal the present discounted value
of minimum future income BK =
0
K;min
R , which is the highest amount agents can repay for sure. But
with log-normal endowments there is a positive probability of having endowment realisations arbitrarily
close to 0, such that this formulation does not lead to a non-zero borrowing limit. The problem can be
avoided by introducing a positive non-stochastic minimum endowment level for all agents in a country.
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2.3.4 Denition of competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is
1. A Consumption Allocation:




k;J is a random variable depending on the realisation of period 2 uncer-
tainty.
2. A set of Portfolios:
For every agent k, a vector ak specifying holdings of all assets in the economy at
the end of period 1.12
3. A Price System, consisting of
 p;p0, the relative prices of F goods in terms of H goods in period 1 and 2,
where p0 is a random variable with distribution 	p0
.
 R, the vector of asset returns.
such that
1. Agents allocate their funds optimally across goods in period 2 given a particular
realisation p0.
2. the allocation solves every household's problem (2.11) in period 1 given a relative
price p, a distribution 	p0


















f;Jdf = 0; 8 i 2 fb;sg; J 2 fH;Fg (each asset is
in zero net supply)
4. The distribution of the future relative price 	p0
is consistent with the joint distri-




F, and individual asset holdings at the end
of period 1.
12Summed across all agents individual quantities imply an aggregate consumption allocation for












J , as well as a country
portfolio of gross and net asset holdings, and a net asset position once net holdings of all assets in
a country are summed at period 1 prices.
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Note that optimal portfolios in this environment depend on the distribution of future
relative prices 	p0
. But the latter depends on expenditure patterns tomorrow, and thus
on savings and portfolio decisions today. In other words, the model has a complicated
circular relationship between savings and portfolio decisions on the one hand, and the
process for market clearing relative prices 	p0
on the other.13 As the next section shows,
the assumption of identical preferences across home and foreign agents breaks the link
between individual portfolios decisions and equilibrium price dynamics.
2.3.5 Equilibrium terms of trade movements
A well-known consequence of identical homothetic preferences across goods is that the
optimal expenditure shares are identical for all agents. Since assets are in zero net supply,
any claim of one country on another thus nets out in the excess demand functions for
home and foreign goods. Their market clearing relative price is thus independent of
the distributions of relative endowments, and of savings decisions in period 1. Taken
together, this implies that the equilibrium terms of trade p are independent of the











Importantly, it is the assumption of identical preferences for all agents in the economy
that separates the equilibrium terms of trade from individual heterogeneity. Individuals
thus take their portfolio decisions conditional on the equilibrium terms of trade as a
function of aggregate uncertainty, which allows a closed form solution for the optimal
heterogeneous portfolios despite the incompleteness of asset markets.14 Since  > 1
2,
the assumption of identical preferences implies that home consumers have a preference
for domestic goods, while foreign consumers have a relative preference for goods from
abroad. Since this study aims to explain stylised facts on individual portfolio decisions
in the US economy, whose goods feature strongly in consumption baskets of many other
countries, this asymmetry does not seem too restrictive.
Another well-known feature of unit-elastic demand for goods is that claims to country-
endowments, or national mutual fund shares, must have equal stochastic consumption
13This is similar to the recursive framework with capital accumulation presented by Krusell and Smith
(1998), where agents need to know the law of motion for the joint distribution of individual asset holdings
and (aggregate and idiosyncratic) shocks, as this determines aggregate savings and thus the returns to
capital tomorrow.
14This is in contrast to the complete markets framework of most studies on aggregate, or country-level,
home bias, which allows more general preferences, for example with symmetric bias towards domestic
goods.
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: = Rs from symmetry. So agents are always indierent between home and foreign
mutual fund shares. In this sense, the equilibrium portfolio is never unique with inter-
national trade in shares. An appendix discusses conditions for uniqueness and existence
of equilibrium.
2.4 Optimal portfolios
Asset holdings dier across individuals for two reasons: rst, although the distributions
of their future endowment income are the same (due to the i.i.d. assumption), agents
dier in wealth due to dierences in period 1 income. To smooth consumption, richer
agents, with higher current income, save more than poorer agents. Second, poor agents,
with low or negative savings, have tomorrow's consumption determined largely by to-
morrow's endowment income. Thus, they prefer assets that are good hedges against

uctuations of endowment income, to limit consumption volatility. Aggregate home
supply shocks reduce the relative price of home goods, and thus the real returns to
home bonds. This makes home bonds better hedges against aggregate home endowment
risk than foreign assets or mutual fund shares. Richer agents, whose consumption is
mainly determined by asset returns, care relatively less about this hedging, and thus
have a lower portfolio share of home bonds.
Note that we can dene portfolio shares in two ways, namely as a share of nancial
wealth, or of total wealth including the present value of claims to future endowments
(see also Campbell 2007, section 2.4). Since consumers are indierent as to the source
of claims, the derivations consider wealth portfolio shares. Proposition 1, however, like
the empirical section of this chapter, considers nancial portfolio shares, dened as a
proportion of gross assets.
I show how wealth portfolios are the sum of 2 sub-portfolios: rst, a "hedge portfolio",
which is the same for all individuals, designed to optimally sell o individual income
risk. And second, a "diversied portfolio", determined only by relative returns and pref-
erences, independent of the level of wealth.
Since real payos to home and foreign mutual fund shares are always equalised by
equilibrium terms of trade movements, in this section I call both of them shares in an
\international mutual fund". This allows me simplify notation by denoting returns on
home and foreign IOUs as RH = RF and those on shares as RS. Similarly, write h's
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corresponding holdings of bonds and shares as ah;H;ah;F;ah;S. I concentrate on the
portfolios of home agents. Note that most of the analysis of this section will be condi-
tional on asset returns, since the model is not designed to yield realistic description of
asset prices. Particularly, I assume that returns on bonds are similar across countries, in
a sense dened below. Within the model, dierences in borrowing limits across countries
s
K;b
K; K 2 fH;Fg provide the necessary degree of freedom for this.
2.4.1 Unconstrained portfolios and the bias of the poor against risky
assets
Consider rst an individual in the home country with non-binding borrowing and short-
selling constraints. Imposing the equilibrium relative price as a function of output, we
can write the four elements of her portfolio as follows




Real share return : ah;SRSY 0
H Y 01 
F
Real return to foreign IOUs : ah;FRBY 0
H Y 0 
F
Real return to home IOUs : ah;HRBY 0 1
H Y 01 
F
The rst thing to note is that share returns co-move perfectly with endowments. So
consumers can short-sell shares to hedge against endowment risk. Furthermore, as  > 1
2
rises to 1, the consumption value of home IOU returns becomes less and less volatile for
home agents. This is why home bias in consumption leads to home bias in bonds. To
see this more in detail, I take a log-approximation to marginal utility and use the log-
normality of random variables to solve the consumer's arbitrage conditions for wealth
portfolio shares as a function of the parameters of the model
g ah;F =




2 + (1   )(   1)

) (2.14)
g ah;S = 2










2 + (   1)

(2.16)
where a tilde denotes ratios with respect to total wealth w = e0
hYH + ah, V is the
variance of aggregate log-output at home and abroad, and y, rk are expected growth
rates and log returns respectively. Note that, since expected endowments are equal
across individuals, the portfolio share of endowment wealth e e0
h falls as total wealth rises.
In line with the intuition, the portfolio thus consists of two parts: a hedge portfolio
that takes a negative position in shares to guard against endowment risk, equal to   e e0
h.
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This part of the portfolio is thus proportional to the relative weight of endowments in
total wealth. The second part is a diversied portfolio, independent of endowments,
that depends on preferences and relative returns. Since  > 1
2 and 
 > 1, this diversied
portfolio has home bias as long as there is not a large excess return on foreign bonds.
The following assumption imposes conditions on the exogenous borrowing limits for this
to hold.
Assumption 2.1. Borrowing limits s
K;b
K; K 2 fH;Fg are such that returns satisfy
the following condition
r = rh   rf >  (2   1)(   1)V < 0 (2.17)
Note that there is no closed form solution to equilibrium prices in this model. But it is
easy to see that in equilibrium we have to have that
rS + y  
1
2
(rb + rf) > 0 (2.18)
In other words, rich agents, with small endowment weights e e0
h, have to have incentives
to hold positive equity positions, as otherwise there would be an oversupply of shares
sold to hedge against endowment risk. This immediately implies that g ah;S rises with
wealth.
2.4.2 Constrained portfolios
Individuals can only sell o a fraction s
H < 1 of their endowment wealth. Since the
optimal portfolio position in shares falls to   e e0
h as we move down the wealth distribution,
there is a strictly positive cuto value of wealth below which the borrowing constraint
on shares is binding. The portfolio shares of investors with w < w that are constrained
in their share position but hold both home and foreign bonds can be derived from their
arbitrage condition as before, yielding



























Agents with low wealth therefore have a constant negative position in shares. The bond
portfolio consists, again, of a hedging and diversied subportfolio. The former consists
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of negative positions in home and foreign bonds, equal to half of the endowment risk that
remained after short-selling the maximum amount of shares. The diversied portfolio
overweighs home bonds, which are good hedges against volatility of aggregate home
endowments that play a stronger role in consumption baskets. Thus g ah;H > g ah;F, and
total portfolios are biased towards home bonds. Also, both the shares of home and
foreign bonds decrease as total wealth w falls, with a slope of 1
2. Taken together, this
implies that, when moving down the wealth distribution, at some positive wealth level
w?? < w the short-selling constraint on foreign bonds will start to bind. Individuals
with wealth w < w?? therefore only have positive investments in home bonds, plus a
constant short position in shares.
2.4.3 The home bias of the poor
Up to this point I have considered portfolio shares as a fraction of total net wealth, in-
cluding endowment wealth. This section maps the results into nancial portfolio shares,
in order to compare them with the stylised facts of section 2. Note that nancial port-
folio shares, denominated as a fraction of gross assets, do not sum to one when agents
have positive and negative asset positions.
Proposition 2.2. The poorest investors with positive gross assets hold home bonds
only. Across the wealth distribution, the nancial portfolio share of home bonds falls,
while those of shares and foreign bonds rise, converging to the portfolio shares of the
diversied portfolio. So poorer agents have both stronger home bias, and a stronger bias
in favour of safe assets.
Proof
Agents with low wealth w < w?? are constrained by both the short-selling constrained for
foreign bonds, and the borrowing limit for shares. But from (2.21), there are investors
with w < w?? that hold positive amounts of home bonds. Their portfolio share of home
bonds is thus 1.




ah;F+ah;H , and imposing g ah;S =  H e e0
h, we get an expression for the
share of IOUs in the nancial portfolio of investors with w : w??  w  w?, who have
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ah;F+ah;H+ah;S falls as gross asset holdings rise. From  > 1
2 and assump-
tion 2.1, the portfolio share of home bonds thus falls, while that of foreign bonds rises,
with gross assets.
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(2.26)
So for unconstrained investors, the portfolio share of shares rises, while the others are
constant. For large wealth levels, as e e0
h
fin
goes to zero, all portfolio shares are thus equal
to those in the diversied portfolio. 
Proposition 1 shows that this simple economic environment is able to replicate the
observed structure of individual asset holdings across the wealth distribution: Poor
individuals do not participate in the markets for foreign or risky assets. And even
beyond the value of wealth that makes participation worthwhile, the portfolio shares of
foreign and risky assets continue to increase as wealth rises.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that, according to the Survey of Consumer Finances,
wealthier US Households invest a higher share of their portfolio in international assets.
This result continues to hold when I take account of the fact that poorer households are
less likely to participate in more sophisticated nancial markets.
Fixed costs of participating in foreign asset markets do not explain the rising portfolio
shares for participants. So I constructed a simple two country model with incomplete
markets and income heterogeneity that can account for this nding. Agents in the
model receive stochastic endowments of a country-specic tradable good which are af-
fected by idiosyncratic and country-specic shocks. Agents are prevented from access
to a complete set of asset markets but can trade in riskless assets and in equity. Assum-
ing log-normal returns, I derived asset portfolios as a function of total investor wealth.
Poorer individuals' consumption is mainly determined by endowment income. Relative
to richer individuals, they therefore have a bias against equity, which has real payos
that co-move strongly with individual endowments. But poorer home agents also have
a relative bias in favour of home vs. foreign bonds, since home bonds are a good hedge
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against aggregate volatility in the supply of home goods, which have a stronger weight
in their consumption.
With regards to policy this study implies that the welfare loss from poorer households'
non-participation in sophisticated nancial markets may be less important than thought.
In future research it would be interesting if this result also holds in dierent environ-
ments. Particularly, one should try to relax the assumptions of unit-elastic preferences,
and explore how the model deals with shocks to demand, rather than the supply shocks
to endowments this study has looked at.





distributions in economies with
limited commitment
Abstract1
Limited commitment to contracts can explain imperfect risk sharing even when individuals have
access to complete insurance markets. Past contributions have focused on the resulting cross-
sectional distribution of consumption (Cordoba 2008, Krueger and Perri 2006). In contrast, this
paper looks at the joint dynamics of income, consumption and wealth implied by the asymmetric
nature of partial insurance under limited commitment, where negative income shocks are largely
insured but positive shocks can lead to large rises in consumption. A theoretical section proves
the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a limited commitment continuum economy where
incomes follow a standard markov process, and solves analytically for the joint equilibrium dis-
tribution of consumption, income and wealth. Building on Krueger and Perri (2005), I show
that individual consumption follows, at least locally, a left-skewed geometric distribution. Also,
the conditional distributions of consumption and wealth are highly non-linear and have a char-
acteristic form of heteroscedasticity, with declining conditional variances as income increases. In
a quantitative part, the paper compares the exact distributions in the Krueger and Perri (2006)
model to non-parametric estimates of their counterparts in US micro-data, and in a simple Aya-
gari economy.
1I would like to thank Arpad Abraham, Piero Gottardi and Nicola Pavoni for comments on an earlier
draft.
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3.1 Introduction
The economist's toolbox has two classical ways of modelling the relation between individ-
ual incomes and consumption: on the one hand, the assumption of complete insurance
markets is especially convenient for macro-economists, as it provides a rationale for their
customary focus on a \representative" consumer. On the other, the permanent income
hypothesis, that individuals smooth consumption of their expected lifetime resources
by simple saving and borrowing, is appealing as it puts minimal requirements on the
assets and information available to individuals. However, empirically, there is evidence
against both perfect risk-sharing (see e.g. Attanasio and Davis 1996) and simple self-
insurance (see e.g. Hall and Mishkin 1982). Moreover, conceptually, the permanent
income hypothesis lacks a micro-foundation for the absence of assets other than non-
contingent bonds, while the complete markets model requires enforcement of very large
and persistent net transfers between individuals, as well as detailed public information
on individual contingencies. More recent alternatives to the classical benchmarks, on the
other hand, do not restrict asset markets a priori, but take seriously the information and
enforcement problems of the complete markets model. Particularly, a growing literature
has looked at economies with \limited commitment", where individuals have the option
to \default" on contracts. As long as default is unattractive, for example because it
leads to exclusion from nancial trade in the future, this setup allows for some, but not
perfect, risk-sharing even against very persistent shocks to income.
Two recent papers analyse the implications of limited commitment for the cross-sectional
distribution of agents in an economy with many agents. Krueger and Perri (2006) show
that the model can help reconcile the substantial rise in US income inequality over the
last 25 years with the more stable inequality of consumption. Cordoba (2008) concludes,
however, that the model captures the concentration of wealth at the top of the distribu-
tion less well than a simple Ayagari self-insurance economy. This paper takes a dierent
strategy. Rather than concentrating on particular moments of marginal distributions, it
analyses, both theoretically and in a calibrated version of the model, the non-parametric
characteristics of the joint distribution of consumption, wealth and income under lim-
ited commitment. Particularly, I show how the asymmetry of insurance under limited
commitment, where negative income risks are pooled but positive shocks lead to idiosyn-
cratic rises in consumption if participation constraints bind, implies a characteristic form
of non-linearity and heteroscedasticity of the joint distributions. The main theoretical
contribution of the paper is to prove existence and uniquencess of a stationary equilib-
rium in a continuum economy with limited commitment to contracts, and to provide
an analytical characterisation of the distribution of consumption, income and nancial
wealth, including a closed form solution for an example with two income states and
CRRA preferences. The theory shows how the asymmetric nature of insurance implies
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declining conditional variances of wealth and consumption along the income distribution,
and a negative relationship between wealth and income on average. The quantitative
part of the paper looks at an economy with capital and a more general income process, to
confront the joint equilibrium distribution, and its characteristic form of non-linearity
and heteroscedasiticity, with the data. For this, I calculate the exact joint distribu-
tions in the Krueger and Perri (2006) calibration of the model, and compare them to
non-parametric estimates of their counterparts from US micro-data, and to those from
a simple Ayagari economy. The results show that, even with a more realistic income
process featuring both near-permanent and transitory shocks, the limited commitment
economy still produces very asymmetric joint distributions: consumption growth has a

oor slightly below zero, but an upward tail that becomes more important for stronger
positive income shocks. And both the mean and variance of wealth fall with income.
Both the data and the Ayagari model produce less heteroscedastic distributions, and
mean wealth that rises with income.
This work contributes to a large literature that analyses insurance contracts with lim-
ited commitment. In early work, Thomas and Worrall (1988) looked at self-enforcing
long-term contracts between a rm and a risk-neutral worker, when both can costlessly
renege on past commitments to take advantage of random 
uctuations in the price of
labour. In equilibrium, wages can 
uctuate, but only to remain within a time-varying
interval of values that satises participation constraints of both parties. Kehoe et al
(1993) prove the rst welfare theorem in an endowment economy with complete mar-
kets where participation-constraints on consumption sets prevent default. Competitive
equilibria are thus constrained ecient, but may feature less than perfect risk sharing
unless discount factors are high enough. Kocherlakota (1996) shows that, with a nite
number of agents, relative marginal utilities are a sucient description of the state of the
economy, and equilibrium contracts have "amnesia": constrained agents' consumption
is independent of past income realisations. Ligan, Thomas and Worrall (1998) show
how this implies asymmetry in the consumption paths of participation-constrained and
unconstrained individuals: all unconstrained agents share (in a marginal utility sense)
the same drop in consumption, while constrained agents experience relative consump-
tion increases depending on their individual income realisations. Alvarez and Jermann
(2000) prove the second welfare theorem and consider asset pricing.
In a similar manner to the present paper, Krueger and Perri (2005) are interested in
participation constrained risk sharing in large western economies, and thus look at a set-
ting with a continuum of agents who receive nite income realisations according to an
identical Markov process. They use a dual method  a la Atkeson and Lucas (1992, 1995)
to show that, for any given interest rate, there exists a unique stationary consumption
distribution, and that aggregate excess demand for consumption increases in interest
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rates. And, based on a conjecture about the existence of a market clearing interest rate,
they characterise the consumption distribution for the special case with 2 iid income val-
ues. Krueger and Uhlig (2006) analyse a similar economy with the dierence that agents
can costlessly switch between competitive insurance providers that are risk-neutral and
at least as patient as the agents themselves. Rather than autarky, the outside option in
this setting thus consists of contracts that break even in expectation over their lifetime,
and which any insurance provider is ready to oer. In equilibrium, however, agents never
switch as they make initial net payments in exchange for insurance transfers in the later
life of the contract. Despite this dierence in the outside option, the authors show that,
with i.i.d. transitions on two income states, the structure of the joint consumption and
income distribution is the same as with exogenous outside options. Finally, Thomas
and Worrall (2007) analyse the same setup but interpret the two i.i.d. income states as
working vs. unemployment. They give an identical characterisation of the steady-state
consumption distribution relative to Krueger and Perri (2005) or Krueger and Uhlig
(2006), but provide an example where they can prove existence of a stationary equilib-
rium, and another one where they show convergence.
Relative to this literature, the theoretical contribution of the present paper is three-fold:
First, I am able to show the existence of a unique stationary equilibrium in a limited
commitment continuum economy with standard markov uncertainty, under standard
assumptions. Second, I provide a closed form for the stationary distribution of con-
sumption, income and wealth with two persistent income values and CRRA preferences.
The marginal distribution of consumption is a left-skewed geometric, and the conditional
variances of both consumption and wealth decline with income. Third, I characterise
analytically the joint distribution for an N-state markov income process. The geometric
nature of consumption continues to hold, but only locally. And with i.i.d. uncertainty,
both consumption and wealth still see their conditional variances decline with income.
The empirical literature has tested the implications of limited commitment models using,
for example, data on consumption and income in rural villages (Townsend 1994, Ligan
et al 1998, Eozenou 2008), or from experimental settings (Barr 2008, Albarran 2003).
More directly relevant to this paper is the work of Krueger and Perri (2006), who analyse
the performance of the limited commitment model, relative to more standard incomplete
markets models, in explaining why consumption volatility has increased much less than
income risk in the United States over the last 30 years. They nd that incomplete mar-
ket models have too limited risk sharing, while the limited commitment model slightly
underpredicts the change in consumption volatility implied by the observed rise in in-
come risk. However, they focus mainly on the relative change in inequality measures.
Cordoba (2008) uses numerical simulations to argue that models with - in his case -
exogenous, debt-constraints can potentially reproduce key features of the cross-sectional
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distribution of consumption, but capture the wealth distribution much less well than
simple incomplete markets models.
In its quantitative section, this paper looks at the shape of joint, rather than marginal,
distributions. This is because the non-linear, heteroscedastic shape of the distributions
results directly from the asymmetric nature of insurance under limited commitment. It
is thus more robust to changes in the calibration or specication of the model than, for
example, the shape of right hand tails of marginal distributions. Particularly, I com-
pare the joint densities of consumption, wealth and income in the Krueger and Perri
(2006) limited commitment economy to, on the one hand, non-parametric estimates
of its counterparts in US micro-data, and, on the other, the distributions in a simple
self-insurance economy. The results show that the data does not reproduce the 
oor in
consumption growth or the declining conditional variances of consumption and wealth
at higher income values that the limited commitment model predicts. Rather, the shape
of the distributions in the data, where mean consumption inceases more or less linearly
with income, and wealth increases, rather than falls, as income rises, seem more in line
with the distributions from the simple Ayagari self-insurance economy.
Section 3.2 describes the environment of a continuum economy with debt-constrained
domestic nancial markets. Section 3.3 derives some characteristics of dynamic equi-
libria on the basis of the associated planner's problem. Section IV gives the analytical
characterisation of the stationary joint distribution of consumption, income and wealth,
and proves the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Section 3.4 reports the results
from a calibration of the model to the US economy and compares them to those from a
simple self-insurance economy, and US micro-data. An appendix contains most proofs.
3.2 A continuum economy with debt-constrained complete
nancial markets
This section presents a simple economy with complete asset markets where insurance
against idiosyncratic income shocks is constrained by individual default, and denes the
competitive equilibrium.
3.2.1 Agents, countries, time
The economy consists of a large number of individuals of unit mass. Individuals are
indexed by i, located on a unit-interval i 2 I = [0;1] with Sigma-Algebra I. Denote
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as I : I ! [0;1] the (constant) non-atomic measure of individuals. Time is discrete
t 2 f0;1;2;:::;1g and a unique perishable endowment good is used for consumption.
3.2.2 The endowment process
The consumption endowment of agent i in period t, zi;t, takes values in a nite set Z:
zi;t 2 Z = fz1 > z2 > ::: > zNg;N  2. Let Z be the power set of Z, and denote as
Z;t : Z ! [0;1] the measure of agents at all (subsets of) income realisations in period
t. Endowments follow a Markov process that is independent of i, and I-measurable
(i.e. fi : zi;t+1 = zkjzi;t = zjg 2 I; 8zj;zk). Specically, it is described by a Markov
transition matrix F that has strictly positive entries fi;j > 0;8i;j, is monotone (in the
sense that the conditional expectation of an increasing function of tomorrow's income
is itself an increasing function of today's income), and has a unique ergodic distribution
Z : Z ! [0;1]. Thus, in the long-run, aggregate (or average) income Y =
R
zidI is
constant, while individual income 
uctuates. Let Z0 : I ! Z be a measurable function
that assigns all individuals an initial income value. Also, let st denote the state of the
economy in period t, a vector containing individual incomes and asset holdings of all
agents.
3.2.3 Preferences





where Es0 is the mathematical expectation conditional on s0, 0 <  < 1 discounts future
utility, ci;t is consumption by agent i in period t, and u : R+ ! R is an increasing, strictly
concave, twice-continuously dierentiable function that saties Inada conditions and is
identical for all agents in the economy.
3.2.4 Asset markets
Agents engage in sequential trade of a complete set of state-contingent bonds. Individ-
ual endowment realisations are veriable and contractable, but asset contracts are not
completelely enforceable: at any point, individuals can default on their contractual pay-
ments at the price of eternal exclusion from nancial markets. Thus the total amount an
agent can borrow today against any income state tomorrow is bounded by the option to
default into nancial autarky. There, consumption is forever equal to income. Given the
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markov structure of income, the value of default as a function of the vector of current




(F)tU(z) = (I   F) 1U(z) (3.2)
Note that the monotonicity of F implies monotonicity of W(z) (Dardanoni 1995).
I denote holdings of Arrow-Debreu securities paying o in state st by a(st). In any state
st, V (z(st);a(st)) is the contract value as a function of income z(st) and current asset
holdings a(st). As in Alvarez and Jermann (2000), individual i's participation constraint
for any state st+1 tomorrow can be written as a portfolio constraint on the claims she can
issue against st+1 income.2 This borrowing constraint is \not too tight" in the words of
Alvarez and Jermann (2000) if it assures participation but does not constrain contracts
otherwise
ai(st+1)  Ai(st+1) = minf(st+1) : V (zi(st+1);(st+1))  W(zi(st+1))g (3.3)
3.2.5 Limited insurance
To focus on the interesting case of limited insurance, I make the following assumptions










Assumption 1 assures that full insurance is not possible, since the autarky value at high
income exceeds that of consuming average income in the economy forever. Assumption
2 implies that there is no positive net interest rate that would implement the autarky
equilibrium, as the marginal rate of substitution between the highest and lowest income
state is too low. Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that this is sucient to rule out
autarky as an equilibrium.
2An alternative is to restrict choices directly, by requiring that the chosen consumption sequence
fulll participation constraints, as in Kehoe and Levine (1993).
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3.2.6 The household's problem
Every period, households maximise their expected utility by choosing current consump-
tion and assets subject to budget and participation constraints




a(s0)q(s0)  a(s) + z(s)
a(s0)  A(s0)
A(s0) = minf(s0) : V (z(s0);(s0))  W(z(s0))g (3.6)
where c;a0 are policy functions of the state variables (z(s);a(s)).
3.2.7 Denition of competitive equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium in this economy is a set of asset prices q(s0), a set of
individual decision rules c(z;a);a0(z;a) with associated value functions V (z;a)
such that
1. V (z;a) are the households maximum value functions associated with the household
problem given q(s0)
2. V (z;a) is attained by c(z;a);a0(z;a)
3. Markets for state-contingent assets clear
R
ai(s0)dI = 0;8s0
The competitive equilibrium is called \stationary" if the distribution of individual con-
sumption is stationary through time.
3.3 Ecient allocations
Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that a version of the rst welfare theorem applies
to this economy as long as interest rates are \high", in the sense that today's market
value of total future resources is nite.3 This allows me to focus on participation-
constrained ecient allocations, where the assumption of some risk sharing assures that
3An additional technical condition requires that for all i, there is a constant i such that for all zt,
ju(ci;t(st))j < i(u
0(ci;t(st)))ci;t(zt)). Note that this is a joint condition on utility and the equilibrium
allocation. It is met in most relevant cases, for example if relative risk aversion is dierent from 1 at
zero, or if consumption is uniformly bounded away from zero, which is the case in the setting of this
paper.
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the interest rate condition is met. More particularly, I exploit the results in Marcet
and Marimon (2009), and focus on the solution to the participation-constrained social
planner's problem.
3.3.1 The planner's problem
Marcet and Marimon (2009) show how the ecient allocation solves the following plan-
ner's problem. For a given measurable assignment of welfare weights to individuals





0 tu(ci;t)dI the problem
of the planner is to distribute resources optimally subject to individuals' participation












Vi(st)  W(zi(st)); 8st;i
where the planner's maximum value VV is a function of the initial measure of weights and
income induced by 0;Z0. I assume that the initial weighting function 0 is measurable
and takes a nite number of nite, positive values 1;:::;k with I(i : i;0 = k) >
0; for k = 1;:::;K and I(fi : i * f1;:::;Kgg) = 0.
Note that this problem is non-standard, because the participation-constraints in (3.7)
introduce history dependence. Intuitively, the planner provides value to individuals
who have attractive outside options by promising them high consumption today and
in the future. But this requires him to honour promises made in the past, making
the problem non-recursive. As a solution, this section applies a technique proposed by
Marcet and Marimon (2009) that makes the problem recursive. Their results, however,
do not apply to continuum economies in general, as they focus on an environment with
a nite number of agents. But with a nite number of income values and a discrete
initial distribution of planner weights, we can always replace integration over an innity
of indivuals i by summation over a countable number of sets of individuals that share
all relevant characteristics. In particular, in any period t, we can split the uncountable
set I into KNt sets of individuals I0;fzg that share initial weight k and income history
fz0;z1;:::;ztg. This ensures the countability of the planner's state space. A later section
shows that this space remains, in fact, strictly nite.
Marcet and Marimon (2009) show how to capture the history dependence of the problem
by an individual-specic summary variable. Particularly, they show that, denoting 
i
the Lagrange multiplier on i's participation constraint in the sequential problem (3.7),
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;z(j;zl)[cjl   zl]  0 (3.9)
0




Z ! [0;1] (3.11)
t _
= f : I(i : i;t = ) > 0g (3.12)
where I write xjl for the function x(j;zl). Note that the weights of individuals in the
social welfare function are now updated every period to meet participation constraints,
according to the law of motion (3.10). Intuitively, by increasing individual weights i the
planner allocates a higher than expected consumption path to individuals with binding
participation constraints, to keep them \happy" with the contract. Policies cjl;
jl are
a function of planner weights at the beginning of the period and current income realisa-
tions only, so do not depend on past state variables. In other words, the time-varying
individual weights now summarise history-dependence of the problem. Importantly, the
cardinality of the set of individual planner weights with positive mass
Wt increases by
a factor of at most N every period, and therefore remains countable. Equivalently, the
integration across individuals along measure I is replaced by the weighted summation
over (the Euclidean product of) the set of current income realisations Z and the time-
varying set of planner weights with positive mass
Wt, where the weights have discrete
measure ;z.
With discrete
Wt and Z, the state space is nite and bounded, and thus compact, for
all t. And Tychono's theorem ensures that it remains compact even for a countably
innite number of periods. With concave utility and nite resources, and in the absence
of aggregate state variables entering the participation constraints, the constraint set is
therefore compact and convex. It is also non-empty since autarky is trivially feasible and
incentive-compatible. Marcet and Marimon (2009) show how this is sucient to ensure
the equivalence of the sequential problem (3.7) and the transformed problem (3.8).4 In
particular, the planner's value function is single valued and, given continuously dier-
entiable utility, dierentiable. And nally, Inada conditions and concavity of the utility
function imply that, to characterise the optimum, participation constraints and the rst
order conditions suce.
4 In other words, the problem fullls conditions A1 to A5 in Marcet and Marimon (2009). For further
detail, see also the proof of existence and uniqueness of a solution to this problem in Broer(2009a), who
considers an economy facing a given world interest rate.
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3.3.2 Properties of ecient allocations
Although this paper is mainly concerned with the stationary joint distribution of con-
sumption, income and wealth, the rest of this section shows two features of any con-
sumption allocation with limited commitment: rst, there is asymmetry in insurance,
as the planner insures consumers against drops in income, while accomodating rises in
income with potentially strong consumption increases. Thomas et al (1998) show this
in an environment with a nite number of agents, while I analyse the implications for
the stationary joint distributions in a continuum economy. Relatedly, contracts feature
\amnesia" (Kocherlakota 1996), as history dependence of individual consumption is cut
o once participation constraints bind. Throughout, I denote as \continuation value"
V (t;zt) the utility that an individual with current weight t and income zt can expect
under the planners consumption allocation, as opposed to the autarky value W(zt) she
gets from consuming her income stream from today onwards.
It is easy to see that the solution of the planner's problem denes an operator   that
maps today's distribution of individual weights and current income into a distribution of
weights and income tomorrow.5 The next Lemma summarises some old and new results
that characterise  .
Lemma 3.3. The planner's decision rule   has the form
i;t+1 = maxft+1(zi;t+1);i;tg
For every t, t(z) is strictly increasing in z; and for every z, the sequence t(z) increases
strictly over time. Also, the set of individual planner weights with positive mass is strictly
nite: jfj : I(fi : i;t = jg) > 0gj < 1;8t.
That individual weights increase when participation constraints bind but are constant
otherwise is well-known from Marcet and Marimon (2009), and follows directly from
the equivalence of 
 and the Lagrange multipliers of the untransformed planner's prob-
lem. Also, since the outside option of autarky only depends on current income, plan-
ner weights of individuals with binding participation constraints t(zi;t) are, for any t,
equally a function only of their current income zi;t. This lack of history dependence
in consumption of constrained individuals is well-known as the "amnesia" property of
5Or formally   : (Z  R
KNt
+ ;Z  B
KNt
) ! [0;1], where B
n is the Borel algebra of the n-dimensional
positive Euclidean space, and the cardinality of the set of welfare weights, equal to K in period 0,
increases by N every period.
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consumption allocations with limited commitment (since Kocherlakota 1996).6
On the other hand, that t(zi;t), the minimum planner weight that ensures participation
of individuals with income zi;t, is strictly increasing in both income and time has not
been shown before. But this result is very useful for showing existence and uniqueness
of a stationary solution to (3.8), and to compute it eciently using rst order condi-
tions. It is proved in the appendix, along with its implication that
Wt, the set of planner
weights i;t, is not only countable but strictly nite.
Lemma 1 has immediate consequences for the dynamics of the joint distribution of
consumption and income. To see this, note that, for  the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the ressource constraint (3.9), the planner's intratemporal optimality condition
equates weighted marginal utilities across agents,  = (i + 
i)U0(ci)8i. From this,









So the current distribution of planner weights maps monotonously into current con-
sumption. There are thus N minimum participation-compatible consumption values
ci
0;t;i = 1;:::;N that correspond to the minimum planner weights t(z) and are increas-
ing in income. From this, it is easy to see that the highest income earners have highest
consumption, while those with lowest consumption have necessarily the lowest income
level. This lowest consumption level, since it solves the participation constraint at min-
imum income with equality, is easily seen to be constant through time, and equal to zN.
So there is a constant lower bound of consumption equal to minimum income.
Intratemporal optimality on the other hand requires growth rates of marginal utility to
equal relative growth rates of planner weights, discounted and adjusted for changes in













This immediately implies that all unconstrained agents, who have constant planner
weights, share the same growth rate of marginal utility, equal to the change in the
discounted marginal value of resources to the planner, which can be used to dene the
interest rate prevailing in competitive equilibrium as 
0 = R. The result is a convenient
law of motion for consumption of unconstrained agents as a function of equilibrium
6 To see this formally, consider two agents i;j with dierent weights i;t 6= j;t who receive a
same income shock zi;t+1 = zi;t+1 that implies autarky values higher than their continuation utility at
current weights. With equal income today, they face the same conditional measures over future income
realisations. So if i;t+1 is the minimum weight that meets i's participation constraint, it is also the
minimum weight that meets j's participation constraint. And since continuation values V (t;zt) are
strictly increasing in t, the cuto t(zi;t) is unique.
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Equations (3.15) and (3.14) show two important characteristics of consumption transi-
tions in limited commitment economies: discreteness and asymmetry. This is because,
unless R = 1 and insurance is perfect, all unconstrained agents share common, discrete
falls in marginal utility over time, independent of their current level of income. Agents
with binding participation constraints after a positive income shock, on the other hand,
experience jumps in consumption to a level that is specic to their current income.
3.4 Existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium
and its distributional characteristics
This section provides an analytical characterisation of the joint distribution of consump-
tion and income. As in Krueger and Perri (2005), I concentrate on stationary consump-
tion distributions.7 The fact that stationarity of the consumption distribution implies
a constant interest rate in the economy and vice versa conveniently means that we can
index dierent stationary distributions by the value of R.8 Krueger and Perri (2005)
show that excess demand is increasing in R for R > 1, and conjecture the existence of a
market clearing value R?. Using a dierent method, I am able to prove the existence of
a unique market clearing interest rate. To do this it turns out to be convenient to rst
characterise the stationary consumption allocation for a given R, and then to exploit its
characteristics to show market-clearing at a particular unique value R?.
3.4.1 The stationary distribution of consumption and income
For the case of two income values and i.i.d. transitions, Krueger and Perri (2005)
show that the stationary ecient allocation under participation constraints features
a consumption distribution with a discrete number of support points and derive the
corresponding frequency mass function. Krueger and Uhlig (2006) show similar results
in an environment where risk-averse agents can choose between risk-neutral insurance
7Note that limited commitment economies also admit non-stationary pareto-inecient equilibria,
where a path of decreasing interest rates conrms expectations of ever tighter borrowing limits, leading
to convergence to autarky. See Bloise et al (2009).
8To see this, look at any minimum participation compatible consumption value c
i
0 and that corre-
sponding to the rst unconstrained transition away from it c
i





implies that this is a constant. The converse is proved by the construction of the stationary distribution
in the appendix.
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providers. Thomas and Worrall (2007), moreover, provide examples where they can
show existence and convergence to this stationary distribution. This section generalises
the previous contributions in several directions: rst, it considers the general case of
N income values with persistent, rather than i.i.d., transitions. Second, it derives a
closed form for both the frequency mass and the support for the joint distributions of
consumption, income and nancial wealth in the case of two persistent income states
when agents have constant relative risk aversion, which allows me to express the variance
of log-consumption as a function of the interest rate R. And third, I focus explicitly on
the joint distribution of consumption and income, which also allows me to derive the
distribution of wealth and nancial income.9
Proposition 3.4. For 1 < R < 1
 the interest rate in stationary equilibrium, the joint
distribution of income and consumption C : CZ  ! [0;1] has the following features:
1. C is discrete, with positive mass at consumption values between minimum income
and some upper bound c1




2. There are N minimum levels of consumption ci
0; i = 1;:::;N under which con-
sumption of agents with income i never falls and where participation constraints
at income zi hold with equality. These threshold levels are constant through time
and increasing in income c1
0 < c2
0 < :::: < cN
0 . The lower bound of the distribution
is minimum income cN
0 = zN.
3. Every consumption threshold ci
0 is an upper bound to a geometric subdistribution
of consumption i
C, with support fci
jg recursively dened by the law of motion
U0(ci
j+1) = (R) 1U0(ci
j);j = 0;1;2;:::, and bounded below by zN. C is thus
a mixture of N   1 geometric distributions. The appendix contains an analytical
expression for the frequencies in this distribution.
4. Individuals at the highest income level z1 all have maximum consumption level
c1
0. The support of consumption conditional on income zi < z1;i > 1 is [ci
0;c1
1].
So the support of consumption narrows as income rises. For i.i.d. transitions
(identical rows in F), this implies that the conditional variance of consumption
falls monotonously in income.
The proof of proposition 3.4 is by construction of the stationary distribution, and can
be found in the appendix. The joint distribution of nancial returns and income follows
as a corollary.
9For the two income i.i.d. case, the joint dynamics of consumption and income are also contained in
Krueger and Perri (2005) and Krueger and Uhlig (2006).
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Corollary 3.5. The joint distribution of net nancial returns and income yfin;z :
B([c1
0   z1;c1
1   zN])  Z  ! [0;1] has the following features:




 Individuals at minimum income have positive nancial returns yN
fin;0  0. All
individuals at the highest income level z1, and participation-constrained individuals
at income zi > zN have negative nancial returns yi
fin;0  0, with strict inequality
for i = 1.
 To the geometric consumption distribution with upper bound ci
0 corresponds a dis-
tribution that consists of a mass point at yi
fin;0  0, plus a support ci
j   yk;k =
1;:::i   1;j = 1;2;:::. The frequency distribution follows from that of the joint
distribution of consumption and income, which can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 3.4 and its corollary show how the asymmetric nature of partial insurance
under limited commitment aects the joint cross-sectional distribution: High income
individuals have a narrow distribution of consumption, as their minimum participation-
compatible consumption level is binding. They also have low nancial returns, as they
are making net contributions into the insurance scheme. Low income earners, on the
other hand, receive net payments from insurance claims, but have a variety of consump-
tion values that decline with the length of their low income spell.
This section has provided a general characterisation of joint distributions under limited
commitment. Previous contributions, on the other hand, have focused on a particular
example, with 2 income values and i.i.d. transitions. I now turn to a similar example
with 2 incomes, but assume persistence in income and preferences that have constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA). This allows me to describe the joint distributions in closed
form, as an illustration of the more general results above.
3.4.2 A closed form example
A simplied version of the economy, with CRRA preferences u = c1 
1  , two income
values fzh;zlg and transition matrix F = [p;1 p;1 q;q], yields a closed form solution.
Proposition 3.6. With N = 2 and CRRA preferences, and for 1 < R < 1
 the interest
rate in stationary equilibrium, denote the joint distribution of income and consumption
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C : C  fzl;zhg  ! [0;1]. The discrete support of consumption C is
c1 = f(p;q;m;Wh;Wl) (3.16)
ci = c1(R)
i
;1 < i < m
cm = zl (3.17)




The frequency mass function is geometric, given by
C(c1;zh) =
1   q
2   q   p
: =  (3.19)





C(;) = 0 otherwise (3.22)
Here, Wh;Wl are the autarky values at zh;zl given by
Wh =
(1   q)u(y0 + 1
) + (1   p)u(y0   1
1 )
1   (q + p)   2(1   (q + p))
(3.23)
Wl =
(1   q)u(y0 + 1
) + (1   p)u(y0   1
1 )
1   (q + p)   2(1   (q + p))
(3.24)















1 . Note that the frequency
mass function C is the same with general, non-CRRA, preferences.
Proof
To obtain the discrete support of consumption C, dene cm as the minimum participation-
compatible consumption for an individual in the low income state zl. As she cannot move
further down in consumption, she is necessarily participation-constrained in both income
states tomorrow, receiving values Wh and Wl respectively. Thus cm is determined from
her participation constraint as
Wl = U(cm) + [(1   q)Wh + qWl]
which is solved by cm = zl from the denition of Wl. So minimum consumption is equal
to minimum income.
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The strict monotonicity of the sequence t(zh) and the niteness of initial weights to-
gether imply that for any i;0, we have t(zh) > i;0 for some nite t. So in the station-
ary allocation, an individual in the high income state is always constrained, receiving
minimum participation-compatible consumption c1, whose value we need to determine.
Tomorrow she either remains at high income, receiving Wh, or gets a negative income




c1. Thus, the expected value of her consumption stream under
the contract can be expressed as the sum of m lotteries with two outcomes: either, in
case of a positive income shock zh, she receives value Wh. Or, in case she moves to




1  ;i = 1 plus participation in the next
lottery for i = 2, and so forth. If she has not received a positive shock after m-1 periods,
her consumption cannot fall by another whole step without violating her participation-
constraint at low income. So there is a nal lottery between receiving Wh and Wl. This












+iqi 1(1   q)Whg + (1   p)mqm 1Wl (3.25)
To derive the mass function C, note that the stationary mass at c1 is that at income
state zh, equal to the rst entry of the normalised left eigenvector of transition matrix
F associated with a unit eigenvalue  =
1 q
2 q p. C(c2;zl) is simply  times transition
probability to low income (1   p), and C(ci;zl) = (1   p)qi 1; i = 2:::m   1 declines
geometrically with survival probability q, the probability of remaining in low income
state zl. Finally, the lower bound cm has mass C(cm) = C(cm 1)
q
1 q. 
The next corollary summarises the shape of the joint distribution of consumption, income
and nancial wealth, dened as the present discounted value of nancial income, and
derives some of its second moments. The proof, including closed forms for the joint
distributions of both nancial income and nancial wealth with endowment income, is
in the appendix.
Corollary 3.7. With CRRA preferences and 2 income values, the following is true:
1. The covariance between income and consumption is positive. The covariances be-
tween income and both nancial returns and wealth are negative.
2. The mean of consumption increases in income. Its conditional variance decreases.
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3. If C(cm;zl)  0, the cross-sectional variance of log-consumption in stationary
equilibrium is




where  > 0 is a function of transition probabilities only. If there is a non-negligible
mass at the truncation point, C(cm;zl) > 0, this is an upper bound for the cross-
sectional variance of individual consumption.
With 2 income values, the asymmetric nature of insurance under limited commitment
thus implies a geometric cross-sectional distribution of consumption. Negative income
shocks lead to a sequence of equal small steps down the distribution, while positive in-
come shocks lead to a variety of consumption responses. And insurance becomes more
ecient at higher interest rates, as illustrated by the negative relationship between the
cross-sectional variance of consumption and R in corollary 3.7. Finally, the negative cor-
relation between nancial wealth and income results because nancial markets provide
some, if not complete, insurance to individuals.
This section has generalised previous characterisations of limited commitment economies
with two income values in several ways. Krueger and Perri (2005), and similarly Krueger
and Uhlig (2006), show for the i.i.d. case that the stationary consumption distribution
under limited commitment is discrete with geometrically declining mass, for a given
constant interest rate. For the CRRA case, I solve for the whole distribution includ-
ing the support of consumption, wealth and nancial income (see appendix) in closed
form, analysing the more general case with persistent income. Moreover, the corollar-
ies to proposition 3.6 characterise conditional and second moments of the distribution,
including a closed form for the variance of log consumption in the case of negligible
truncation, showing how lower interest rates are associated with higher consumption
variance in stationary equilibrium.
3.4.3 Existence and uniqueness of a market-clearing interest rate
The previous sections characterised the equilibrium distribution of consumption and
income for a given level of interest rates R. This section proves the existence of a unique
stationary market-clearing interest rate R? > 1.






8c1 < c2 (3.27)
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then there exists a unique stationary market-clearing interest rate R? > 1.






[ of interest rates to the space of stationary consumption distributions.
By summing over the distribution and subtracting constant aggregate income Y , this




dI   Y . Note that this
mapping is single-valued, as the algorithm has a unique solution for any R 2 IR, and that
J
(R) coincides for R > 1 with the stationary solution to the planners problem given





u0(zN). The proof shows that
J
(R) is decreasing for Raut < R < 1 and
increasing for 1 < R < 1
. This implies that for some R? > 1 excess demand is negative.
Existence then follows from the fact that excess demand must be positive for R = 1
 as
perfect insurance is unfeasible by assumption. Uniqueness follows from the monotonicity
of
J
(R) for R > 1.
From Proposition 3.4, the consumption distribution C splits naturally into N subdistri-
butions m
C bounded above by cm
0 , the minimum participation-compatible consumption
at income zm;m = 1;:::;N. For any m, consider m
C as a function of the interest rate
R. For an individual who is constrained at income zm we can write
V (cm







ijjmu(zij)] = 0 (3.28)
where the last equality follows from the fact that the participation constraint is binding.
Here, i is the index for unconstrained transitions of consumption starting from the
constrained level cm
0 , i = 0;1;:::;n. zij;j = N;N 1;::: are the possible income states for
an individual who has remained unconstrained for i periods, with associated conditional
probabilities ijjm, while ijm =
P
j ijjm is the marginal probability that an individual
at income zm remains unconstrained for i periods, and 0 = 1. Note that in (3.28),
only unconstrained states appear, as continuation and autarky values cancel in the
participation constraint for all constrained future states. Dierentiating (3.28) totally










where the second equality follows from the law of motion (3.15). Since R i is a positive
sequence, dci has to take both negative and positive values.
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The constant term 2 is strictly positive, while 0 < 1  1 for any utility function






dR , while if
dci 1
dR > 0, dci
dR > 0. In other words, the sequence dci crosses the zero
line exactly once from below. The change of aggregate consumption by individuals on









iR idci = 0 for R < 1 (R > 1) (3.31)
where the inequality (inverse inequality) follows from the fact that R i overweighs (un-
derweighs) the latter, positive elements of the sequence dci when interest rates are below
(above) 1. As this holds for all m,
J
is decreasing in interest rates at levels R < 1,
reaching a minimum at R = 1, and rises with R from thereon. Since for R = 1=
insurance is perfect, which is unfeasible by assumption 3.1, excess demand crosses the
zero line exactly once at some 1 < R < 1
. 
3.5 The distribution of consumption and wealth compared
to the data
This section looks at the stationary joint distribution of consumption, income and
wealth, characterised theoretically in the previous section, for a calibrated version of
the US economy. I compare these to the distributions in a standard self-insurance econ-
omy on the one hand, and in US micro-data on the other.
Previous studies on consumption insurance in calibrated economies usually have not
looked at the shape of the implied joint distributions, but focused on particular mo-
ments of marginal distributions. This is true also for studies of limited commitment
economies, such as Krueger and Perri (2006) who analyse changes in cross-sectional
variances of income and consumption over time, or Cordoba (2008), who concentrates
on variances and the upper tails of marginal distributions. Studies of the empirical
distribution of consumption and income, on the other hand, have pointed out asym-
metries. Battistin et al (2007), for example, conclude that the marginal distribution of
consumption is close to a log-normal, i.e. has signicant right-hand skew. Dynan et al
(2006) show that in PSID data, while consumption responds more strongly to negative
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income shocks, this asymmetry has fallen over time, which they take as evidence of de-
clining liquidity constraints. Krueger and Perri (2008), on the other hand, show that in
the Italian Household Survey the relation between nondurable consumption and income
changes unexplained by a rst stage regression on household characteristics is largely
linear, with a slightly stronger response of consumption to positive income changes. This
section looks at asymmetries in joint distributions both in theory and US micro-data.
3.5.1 A quantitative model calibrated to the US economy
This section brie
y describes the Krueger and Perri (2006) calibration of a limited com-
mitment economy with production. For the income process, the authors assume the
log of post tax labour income plus transfers (LEA+) log(zt) to be the sum of a group
specic component t and an idiosyncratic part yt. The latter, in turn, is the sum of
a persistent AR(1) process mt, with persistence parameter  and variance 2
m, plus a
completely transitory component "t which has mean zero and variance 2
".
The process for LEA+ is thus of the form
log(zt) = t + yt
yt = mt + "t





Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), the authors rst partial
out the group-specic component t as a function of education and other variables,
identifying the variance of the idiosyncratic part of income yt, as well as (from the short
panel dimension of the CEX) its rst order autocorrelation. Setting  = 0:09989, the
value estimated by Storesletten et al (2004), then allows the identication of 2
 and
2
". In this study, I use 2
 = 0:26 and 2
" = 0:12, the estimate for the year 2003, the
endpoint of the Krueger and Perri (2006) sample. I then use the standard Tauchen
and Hussey (1999) method to approximate the resulting process using a 7-state Markov
chain for mt, and a binary process for t. It is important to note that the resulting 14
state Markov process does not full the monotonicity assumption of the theory section,
as transitions are identical across transitory shocks. The income process thus belongs
to a more general class than that analysed in the previous sections.
For preferences, I choose a CRRA utility function with coecient of relative risk aversion
of 1 (log-preferences) and a discount factor of 0:96. In order to capture the features of
the US economy more accurately than in the simple theoretical model, I allow agents
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to save at the equilibrium interest rate after default, and introduce production in the
economy. In particular, I assume that competitive rms hire capital and labour from
households to operate a Cobb-Douglas technology
Y = AKL1  (3.33)
and set the labour share  to 0.3. Again, the calibration follows Krueger and Perri
(2006), who choose the depreciation rate of capital  and total factor productvity A to
target a capital-output ratio of 2.6 and an interest rate of 4 percent in their benchmark
period. The corresponding values of A and  are 0:9637 and 0:0754 respectively. The
computational algorithm rst solves for the stationary equilibrium for a given interest
rate, following the appendix that describes the recursions that derive the stationary
consumption distribution in the general case.10 I then use the bisection method to nd
the market clearing interest rate R?.
3.5.2 Joint distributions of c,y,w - Theory and non-parametric esti-
mates from US micro-data
This section presents the joint distributions of consumption, wealth and income. In
particular, I compare the distributions in Krueger and Perri's (2006) limited commitment
economy to non-parametric estimates of their counterparts in US-microdata, as well as
those in a simple self-insurance Ayagari economy. The latter has the same income
process, technology and preferences described before, but agents can only save and
borrow in uncontingent bonds subject to a borrowing limit equal to annual income. I
calculate the joint distributions by applying a simple histogramm density estimator to
the exact theoretical distribution of the limited commitment model, and to a simulation
of the Ayagari economy.11 To compare the theoretical densities to the data, I then
estimate bivariate kernel densities for US data on consumption and wealth, based on an
optimal choice of the bandwith as in Botev et al (2009).
10I amend this for the fact that, with purely transitory shocks t, the monotonicity condition for F
does not hold. So I need to reshue income states occasionally in order to have decreasing minimum-




0 > ::: > c
N
0 during the algorithm. The solution
is facilitated by the fact that, if this monotonicity condition holds, c
i
0 can be found quickly using
bisections on an interval [zi;c
i+1
0 ]. This yields an algorithm that is extremely ecient when solving
for the stationary consumption distribution.
11The histogramm density estimation for the Ayagari economy is based on an individual simulated
income and consumption path of 100.000 periods, of which I discard the rst 1000 for the estimation.
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3.5.2.1 The distribution of consumption and income
Figures 3 and 4 use consumption and income data from the 2003 wave of the US Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to confront their estimated joint density with that
from the models. Particularly, I use the dataset constructed by Krueger and Perri (2006),
and their denition of income and consumption. Their income measure corresponds to
the CEX measure of after-tax labour earnings plus transfers (the sum of wages and
salaries of all household members, plus a xed fraction of self-employment farm and
nonfarm income, minus reported federal, state, and local taxes (net of refunds) and So-
cial Security contributions). Importantly, the consumption series includes an imputed
measure of services from durables (for details see Krueger and Perri 2006). From both
of these series I partial out the eect of a vector of observable individual characteristics,
to control for ex-ante dierences or predictable changes in life-time wealth.12
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 show that the results from the theory continue to hold with the
more general income process: the marginal distribution of consumption in the Krueger
and Perri (2006) calibration, presented in gure 3.1 where equal colours correspond
to individuals who were last constrained in the same income state, is a mixture of
geometric subdistributions. And gure 3.2 shows that consumption rises on average with
current income, but is highly heteroscedastic. In particular, the conditional variance of
consumption declines as we move up the income distribution. The Ayagari economy,
interestingly, also has some decline in conditional variances, although less so than the
limited commitment economy. The data has a roughly homoscedastic, increasing shape
of the conditional distribution. Figure 3.3 presents the joint distribution of consumption
and income growth. Its rst striking features are the important dierences between the
2 model densities: in the limited commitment economy, as suggested by theory, income
declines are perfectly shared, resulting in a 
oor to the distribution slightly below zero.
Positive income shocks are followed by a variety of positive consumption responses,
leading to a strong rise in the conditional variance of the distribution for larger shocks.
The Ayagari model on the other hand has a much more homoscedastic shape around
a roughly linear mean response of consumption to income growth. To compare these
distributions to the data, gure 3.3 uses log-dierences of the raw data, not the residuals
from the rst stage regression. The resulting estimate of the distribution shows neither
the downward cap, nor the heteroscedasticity of the limited commitment model. Rather,
the cloud character of the picture suggest important measurement error in the CEX
12Particularly, unless otherwise mentioned, I use residuals from a regression of income and consumption
on a cubic in the household head's age, and dummies that equal 1 if the household head has a unversity
degree, a college degree, a high school degree, is male, is black, is asian, or of some other non-white race.
I concentrate on households where the head is between 16 and 64 years of age.
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Figure 3.1: The marginal distribution of consumption
The gure shows the marginal distribution of consumption in the Krueger and Perri (2006)
calibration. Equal colours denote individuals that were last constrained at equal income values
and are thus located on the same geometric subdistribution of consumption.
data. The picture is practically unchanged if we use the residuals from the rst stage
regression.
3.5.2.2 The distribution of wealth and income
Figure 3.4 performs a similar exercise for the joint distribution of wealth and income,
using the net worth variable of the 2004 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF), and chopping o the upper 1 percent of all distributions to control for outliers
and top-coding.
In the limited commitment economy insurance lowers the nancial wealth of high in-
come households. So, even with the more general income process, the income rich have
minimum wealth. Since individuals slowly deplete their wealth levels after a negative
income shock, the income poor have a variety of positive wealth levels, including the
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Figure 3.2: The joint distribution of consumption and income
The gure shows the joint densities of consumption and income in the limited commitment
economy, a simple Ayagari economy, and in CEX data. The size of dots is proportional to the
frequency mass at that point. The kernel density estimate of the empirical distribution uses an
optimal bandwith (Botev et al 2008), and is based on residuals from a rst-stage regression of
the variables on observable individual characteristics as described in the main text.
Broer, Tobias (2009), Heterogeneous Individuals in the International Economy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/13714Chapter 3. Stationary equilibrium distributions under limited commitment 77

























































Figure 3.3: The joint distribution of consumption and income changes
The gure shows the joint densities of consumption and income growth in the limited commit-
ment economy, a simple Ayagari economy, and in CEX data. The size of dots is proportional to
the frequency mass at that point. The kernel density estimate of the empirical distribution uses
an optimal bandwith (Botev et al 2008), and is based on dierences in the raw data.
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Figure 3.4: The joint distribution of nancial wealth and income
The gure shows the joint densities of wealth and income in the limited commitment economy,
a simple Ayagari economy, and in SCF data. The size of dots is proportional to the frequency
mass at that point. The kernel density estimate of the empirical distribution uses an optimal
bandwith (Botev et al 2008), and is based on residuals from a rst-stage regression of the variables
on observable individual characteristics as described in the main text.
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Figure 3.5: The joint distribution of net nancial returns and income
The gure shows the joint densities of nancial returns and income in the limited commitment
economy, a simple Ayagari economy, and in SCF data. The size of dots is proportional to the
frequency mass at that point. The kernel density estimate of the empirical distribution uses an
optimal bandwith (Botev et al 2008), and is based on residuals from a rst-stage regression of
the variables on observable individual characteristics as described in the main text.
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highest in the economy. In the Ayagari economy, on the other hand, the buerstock
nature of wealth leads on average to a positive relationship between income and wealth
levels. But there is large variation around the mean, as individuals slowly build up, or
draw down, their wealth after income changes. The mass of individuals at the borrowing
constraint clearly rises as income falls. Comparing this to the SCF data, we see both an
increase in mean wealth, as well as in its variance, as income, measured as salaries plus
a proportion of business income, rises.
The SCF is a cross-section, so does not allow us to look at changes in wealth. But
gure 3.5 compares the joint distributions of nancial income and earned income in the
model and the data. Again, the insurance mechanism leads to a strong negative cor-
relation between income and nancial returns in the limited commitment model, with
the expected declining conditional variances. In the data, we nd a positive relationship
between nancial and other income, as in the Ayagari model.
3.6 Conclusion
This study has looked at the equilibrium distribution of agents in an economy where lim-
ited commitment to contracts constrains risk-sharing. The theoretical contribution was
to prove existence and uniquencess of a stationary equilibrium in a continuum limited
commitment economy, and to provide an analytical characterisation of the distribution
of consumption and income, including a closed form solution for an example with two
income states and CRRA preferences. The theory showed how the asymmetric nature
of insurance in the model, where negative shocks are shared but positive shocks lead to
idiosyncratic consumption growth, implies declining conditional variances of wealth and
consumption along the income distribution, and a negative relationship between wealth
and income on average. The quantitative part of the paper looked at a limited com-
mitment economy with capital and a more general income process, to compare the joint
equilibrium distributions, and their characteristic non-linearity and heteroscedasiticity,
with non-parametric estimates of the counterparts in US micro data, and those in a
simple Ayagari economy. The results showed that, even with a more realistic income
process featuring both near-permanent and transitory shocks, the limited commitment
economy still produces very asymmetric joint distributions: consumption growth has a

oor slightly below zero, but an upward tail that becomes more important for stronger
positive income shocks. And both the mean and variance of wealth fall with income.
Importantly, both the data and the Ayagari model have less heteroscedastic distribu-
tions, and mean wealth that rises with income.
The approach of this paper, to focus on the shape of joint distributions in order to test
economic models with heterogeneous agents against the empiricial evidence, provides
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plenty of room for further research. One direction would be to generalise the model
economies analysed here, to see if their characteristics are robust. For example, chapter
4 shows that amending the calibration used in this paper to include some heterogeneity
in discount factors can largely reconcile the model-impact of near-permanent income
shocks on current consumption growth with the data. On the other hand, a more
thorough description of the joint distributions in micro-data is needed. Here, the new
dataset provided by Blundell et al (2008), who have imputed a series of non-durable
consumption for the PSID on the basis of its food expenditure information and a con-
sumption demand function estimated on CEX data, seems very promising. And nally,
the equality of model distributions and data should be tested more rigorously, accounting
appropriately for the important role of measurement error in the data.




Partial insurance with limited
commitment
Abstract
Blundell et al (2008) have recently presented new evidence on the response of consumption to
permanent and transitory income shocks in US micro-data. I analyse this relationship in an
economy with limited commitment to contracts. For a simple version of the model, I derive the
response of consumption to income shocks in closed form, including an expression for the upward
bias of Blundell et al's estimator in this environment, where their identifying assumption of no
history dependence in consumption is violated. I then compute the response of consumption to
income shocks in the calibrated limited commitment economy presented by Krueger and Perri
(2006). In their original calibration to the US economy, consumption responses to permanent
shocks are an order or magnitude smaller than in the data. But the introduction of a limited
amount of heterogeneity in discount factors brings the model roughly in line with the data. In
both calibrations, however, the upward bias of Blundell et al's identication scheme leads to
estimates about twice as large as the true value of the coecients.
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4.1 Introduction
Understanding the response of household consumption to income changes is crucial not
only as a test of economic theory, but also, for example, in order to evaluate the welfare
consequences of inequality or the eectiveness of scal and other policies. Recently,
Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008, BPP) have presented important new evidence
on the eect of income shocks on consumption, based on a novel US data set they con-
structed. In particular, the authors show that the consumption response to permanent
income shocks is much less than one for one. This \partial insurance" not only con-
tradicts the simple permanent income hypothesis, but also exceeds the level we could
expect from a more realistic life-cycle model with self-insurance (Kaplan and Violante
2009).1 BPP discuss their results in the context of recent work on models with superior,
but limited, risk-sharing, due for example to limited commitment to contracts. How-
ever, rather than using a specic model, they provide stylised facts for others to match.
This paper compares their evidence to the degree of partial consumption insurance in a
standard limited commitment economy, where insurance is limited because individuals
can default on contracts. I nd that in the Krueger and Perri (2006) calibration of this
environment, consumption responses to permanent shocks are an order or magnitude
smaller than in the data. But the introduction of a limited amount of heterogeneity in
discount factors brings the model much closer to the coecients estimated by Blundell et
al (2008). However, I also show, both quantitatively and in a simple analytical example,
that their estimates have a strong upward bias in the particular environment of a limited
commitment economy, where their identifying assumption of no history dependence in
consumption is violated.
Tests for models of consumption insurance often face data problems. Particularly, the
identication of shocks to individual incomes and their eect on consumption requires
longitudinal panel data on income and consumption that for many countries is not avail-
able, including the US and the UK. There, authors have either used the information on
food consumption in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID, Hall and Mishkin
1982), relied on synthetic cohorts of groups of individuals with similar characteristics
(Attanasio and Davis 1996, Attanasio and Pavoni 2007), or used data from the US
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) with its, however, very limited panel dimension
(Krueger and Perri 2006). Recently, in a seminal contribution, BPP have imputed a
series of non-durable consumption for the PSID by using its food expenditure informa-
tion and a consumption demand function estimated on CEX data. This allowed them,
1Krueger and Perri (2009), however, nd that a realistic mix of permanent vs. transitory shocks in
a simple permanent income model could explain the observed co-movement of income and consumption
growth in the Italian Household survey.
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under some assumptions, to identify the variances of permanent and transitory income
shocks, as well as their impact on current consumption. Importantly, while they can-
not reject perfect insurance against transitory shocks to income, they nd evidence of
excess smoothness, with only 2/3 of permanent income shocks translating into current
consumption.
Although BPP do not assume a particular economic environment, they discuss their
results in the context of recent models where information asymmetries or limited com-
mitment to contracts lead to \partial" insurance against income shocks. Attanasio
and Pavoni (2007), for example, argue that an economy where insurance is constrained
because individuals can hide both their productivity and their savings can achieve risk-
sharing that is not perfect, but superior to self-insurance. A number of other con-
tributions have looked at economies where agents cannot commit to honour nancial
contracts, which are assumed to be enforceable only by the threat of exclusion from
future nancial trade. Risk-sharing is generally not perfect in this setting, as fortunate
individuals with high income realisations would prefer the outside option of nancial
autarky, rather than make large net payments into the insurance scheme. Alvarez and
Jermann (2000) and Kehoe and Levine (1993) derive conditions for partial consump-
tion insurance in this setting and prove the welfare theorems. And Krueger and Perri
(2006) show how a calibrated limited commitment economy can reconcile the small rise
in cross-sectional consumption inequality in the US over the past 25 years with a much
larger observed rise in income volatility, as the latter strengthens the threat of market
exclusion and thus improves insurance. In line with this previous evidence, BPP nd a
slightly smaller reaction of consumption to permanent income shocks in the second half
of their sample, where income is more volatile. They take this as evidence in line with
the nancial deepening eect of higher income volatility predicted by limited commit-
ment models.
This paper provides a formal comparison between the degree of partial insurance in a
limited commitment economy and that estimated by BPP for the US. It is related to
Kaplan and Violante (2009), who perform a similar exercise for a life-cycle version of
the Ayagari (1993) self-insurance economy. The rst contribution of this paper is to cal-
culate the BPP partial insurance coecients in a standard limited commitment model
calibrated to the US economy. Relative to previous contributions that concentrated on
moments of the cross-sectional consumption distribution (Krueger and Perri 2006, Cor-
doba 2008), this paper thus provides a new test of limited commitment theory based
on the dynamic comovement of consumption with income shocks. But importantly, the
fact that the theoretical model species both permanent and transitory income shocks
exactly also allows me to test the assumptions underlying BPP's empirical model. Par-
ticularly, I calculate, both in a simple analyitical example and the calibrated model, the
bias in the BPP estimates relative to the true population values identied in the model.
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And nally, I analyse the evolution of the BPP coecients when feeding the observed
changes in US income volatility since the 1980s into the model, to test the BPP con-
jecture of a nancial deepening eect of increased income volatility on the size of their
coecients.
The results show that in the benchmark Krueger and Perri (2006) calibration of the
limited commitment economy, consumption insurance is much stonger than in the data.
But the introduction of a limited amount of heterogeneity in discount factors yields
coecient estimates roughly in line with the data. In both calibrations, however, the
upward bias of Blundell et al's identication scheme leads to estimates about twice as
large as the true value of the coecients.
Section 4.2 describes the environment of a continuum economy with a limited com-
mitment problem in nancial markets, and provides an analytical solution to the BPP
coecients in a simple version of the model. Section 4.3 analyses a version of the model
with capital, calibrated to the US economy, and presents the main results on the size of
the BPP coecients in this context, their evolution over time, and the bias in the BPP
estimates.
4.2 Linear insurance coecients in a simple limited com-
mitment economy
4.2.1 The BPP method: linear partial insurance coecients
To analyse the dynamic properties of individual income, we need data that records
the income of particular households over several periods. In the US, the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) has traditionally been used for this. In order to analyse
the joint dynamics of income and consumption, however, researchers there traditionally
faced the problem that the PSID only contains information on food consumption and
a few other items. Detailed US consumption data, on the other hand, can be found
in the consumer expenditure survey (CEX). The latter, however, has only a very short
panel component. BPP's rst contribution is to use the PSID's information on food
expenditure, together with a consumption demand function estimated from CEX data,
to impute a comprehensive PSID consumption series.
In order to analyse the degree of insurance against income 
uctuations in this new
dataset, the authors make a set of assumptions rich enough to allow identication of
income shocks, and their impact on current consumption. Particularly, BPP assume the
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following income process
yi;t = zi;t + "i;t (4.1)
where zi;t is a permanent component that follows a random walk with shocks i;t , and
"i;t is a transitory shock that has an MA(q) structure. BPP then estimate the response
of current consumption to permanent and transitory income shocks in the following
linear equation
ci;t = i;ti;t + 'i;t"i;t + i;t (4.2)
where ci;t denotes the log-dierence of consumption of individual i in period t, and i;t
is an error term that captures consumption growth unexplained by, and assumed to be
uncorrelated with, income movements. The \BPP coecients" i;t and 'i;t thus mea-
sure the linear association between income shocks and current consumption growth. A
value of 1 would correspond to perfect comovement of consumption and income shocks,
while perfect insurance would require both to be zero. In other words, any value of i;t
and 'i;t between 0 and 1 indicates \partial insurance" of consumption against income
shocks.
Without further assumptions, it is generally impossible to identify the variance of the
income shocks or the coecients i;t and 'i;t from data on consumption and total in-
dividual disposable income alone. But the authors show that they can identify the
coecients in (4.2) using data only on consumption growth and various leads and lags
of income growth as long as the following orthogonality conditions hold
cov(ci;t;i;t 1) = cov(ci;t;i;t+1) = 0 (4.3)
cov(ci;t;"i;t 2) = cov(ci;t;"i;t+1) = 0 (4.4)
Under this assumption, and abstracting from the MA structure of "i;t, BPP show how
i;t and 'i;t are identied as follows
BPP
t =
E[ct(yt 1 + yt + yt+1)]






Using this identication scheme, BPP's preferred estimate for BPP
t is 0:65, signicantly
dierent from both 0 and 1 and thus providing evidence for partial insurance against
permanent income shocks. The coecient is smaller, however, for the subsample of
households with college-educated heads, and is estimated to be \slightly lower" in the
later part of the 1980s. Together with an estimated increase in variances of i;t and "i;t,
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BPP take this as evidence in line with the intuition from limited commitment models,
that more volatile income increases the benets of access to nancial markets, and thus
mitigates the problem of default. Insurance of consumption against transitory shocks on
the other hand is estimated to be full, as 'BPP
t is not signicantly dierent from zero.
Finally, the life-cycle prole of the coecients, when estimated separately for dierent
cohorts, turns out to be relatively 
at.
4.2.2 Income and consumption comovement under limited commit-
ment to contracts
BPP do not specify a particular economic environment for their analysis. Rather than
a \specic structural interpretation" the authors want to provide \ \structured facts"
\ (sic, p. 1889). Their estimates thus give us a set of stylised facts that models of
consumption insurance in the US economy should be able to replicate. One goal of
this paper is to perform this test for a standard complete markets economy where lim-
ited commitment to contracts restricts risk sharing between individuals. In addition,
however, the assumption of a particular economic environment also allows me to assess
wether or not the BPP identication assumptions (4.3) and (4.4) hold in the model, and
thus wether the estimates can be interpreted as partial insurance coecients.
4.2.2.1 The economy
This paper analyses partial insurance in an economy where asset markets are complete,
so agents can in principle insure each other against income risk by writing contracts
conditional on any possible contingency ex ante. However, individuals cannot commit to
honouring contracts ex post, as they have the opportunity to deny payment at any time,
at the price of exclusion from all nancial trades in the future. After declaring default,
agents thus simply consume their income forever. The resulting higher volatility of
consumption gives individuals incentives to honour some contractual net payments. But
they may not nd it optimal to honour contracts requiring larger transfers. Insurance
can thus be partial, as anticipation of default inhibits some but not all risk-sharing
contracts.
Particularly, the economy I analyse consists of a large number of individuals of unit
mass. Time is discrete and a unique perishable endowment good is used for consumption.
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where E is the mathematical expectation operator, ci;t is consumption by agent i in
period t, and u : R+ ! R is an increasing, strictly concave, continuously dierentiable
function that saties Inada conditions. Note that I index the discount factor  by a
subscript i to allow for some heterogeneity in preferences, on top of that in incomes.
I amend the BPP framework by assuming, for tractability, that individual income en-
dowments lie in a nite set Z, zi;t 2 Z = fz1 > z2 > ::: > zNg;N  2. Thus, while
incomes can be very persistent, income shocks to the innitely lived agents cannot be
permanent. Rather, they follow a Markov process that is identical for all agents and
described by a monotone transition matrix F with strictly positive entries Fij and a
unique ergodic distribution. Thus, in the long-run, aggregate (or average) income is
constant, while individual income 
uctuates. In the calibrated model, I will use a nite-
state approximation to an AR(I) process with a persistence parameter of 0:9989, the
value estimated by Storesletten et al (2004).
Agents engage in sequential trade of a complete set of state-contingent bonds. Individ-
ual endowment realisations are veriable and contractable, but asset contracts are not
enforceable: at any point, individuals can default on their contractual payments at the
price of eternal exclusion from nancial markets. Thus, the total amount an agent can
borrow today against any income state zj tomorrow is bounded by the option to default
into nancial autarky. There, consumption is forever equal to income. Given the markov
structure of income, the value of default as a function of the vector of current income z




(F)tU(z) = (I   F) 1U(z) (4.7)
In any state st, V (z(st);a(st)) is the contract value as a function of income z(st) and
holdings of state-specic Arrow Debreu securities a(st). As in Alvarez and Jermann
(2000) individual i's participation constraint for any state st+1 can be written as a
portfolio constraint on the claims she can issue against st+1 income.2 This borrowing
constraint is \not too tight" in the words of Alvarez and Jermann (2000) if it assures
participation but does not constrain contracts otherwise
ai(st+1)  Ai(st+1) = minf(st+1) : V (zi(st+1);(st+1;0))  W(zi(st+1))g (4.8)
2An alternative is to restrict choices directly, by requiring that the chosen consumption sequence
fulll participation constraints, as in Kehoe and Levine (1993).
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The household's problem is to maximise their expected utility by choosing current con-
sumption and assets subject to budget and participation constraints




a(s0)q(s0)  a(s) + z(s)
a(s0)  A(s0)
A(s0) = minf(s0) : V (z(s0);(s0))  W(z(s0))g (4.9)
where c and a0 are policy functions of the state variables z(s);a(s).
4.2.2.2 Equilibrium comovements of income and consumption with limited
commitment
In chapter 3 I use the method proposed by Marcet and Marimon (2009) to analytically
characterise the stationary joint distribution of consumption and income in this econ-
omy, and show conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Like in standard
incomplete market models, unless perfect insurance is feasible, the equilibrium interest
rate R in this economy is smaller than the rate of time preference 1
. This is because
portfolio constraints lower the supply of state-contingent bonds, which bids up their
average price, and thus reduces the interest rate. With low interest rates, agents are
relatively impatient, and would like to substitute future consumption in favour of con-
sumption today. This front-loading of consumption, however, is limited by the portfolio
constraints on debt issuance (4.8), which dene a minimum consumption level for ev-
ery income realisation. In stationary equilibrium, there are N such minimum levels
ci;i = 1;:::N, where participation constraints of individuals with income zi are binding.
It is easy to show that these consumption levels for constrained agents are increasing
in income, and that the lowest equals minimum income, cN = zN, providing a 
oor of
the consumption distribution that just ensures participation of individuals at the lowest
income level.3 On the other hand, agents that are not constrained by their outside op-
tion of default, for example after a negative income shock, optimally choose a smooth
downward sloping path of consumption, according to the law of motion
U0(ci) = RU0(c0
i) (4.10)
Figure 4.1 shows the resulting consumption path for a simple example where preferences
are homogeneous with constant relative risk aversion , and individual income only takes
3This is because constrained individuals at minimum income will be constrained in all states of the






which from the denition of W
N is solved by c
N = z
N .
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two values fzh;zlg. There is a constant consumption level for all high-income periods,
dened by participation constraints, while consumption during low-income spells follows







Figure 4.1: The consumption path under limited commitment with two income values.
Figure 4.1 and the preceding discussion demonstrate how BPP's model (4.2) fails to
capture two key features of consumption insurance with limited commitment. First, the
linear specication ignores the asymmetry of consumption responses in the model, where
positive income shocks are followed by a variety of sometimes large rises in consumption,
while negative income shocks always reduce consumption by small amounts independent
of current income. Second, the focus on current income and consumption growth masks
the history dependence in consumption of unconstrained agents, whose consumption
today is a function of their consumption value yesterday, according to (4.10). Only
for constrained agents, there is \amnesia" (Kocherlakota 1996) in consumption, which
becomes a function of their current income only. In other words, since unconstrained
indivdiuals use asset markets to spread the consumption response to income shocks
beyond the period when they occur, contemporaneous covariances ignore a part of the
consumption and welfare eect of income 
uctuations in limited commitment economies.
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4.2.2.3 An analytical solution to linear insurance coecients
Although the BPP model does not fully capture the nature of insurance in the limited
commitment model, we can use their linear regression coecients as an indicator for the
average degree of insurance in the economy that any theoretical model should match. It
turns out that, conditional on an interest rate R, we can easily calculate the regression
coecient of log consumption growth on log income growth in our example with CRRA








b  + b R
b zh   b zl
(4.11)
where hats denote logarithms.4 Thus, the degree of partial insurance falls, or the re-
gression coecient rises, when interest rates fall or the persistence of low income states
rises. This is intuitive, as it is mainly the large rises in consumption of individuals
who receive a positive shock after a long number of low-income periods that determines
the covariance of consumption and income. Higher persistence q lengthens low-income
spells, and lower R increases the down-ward slope of consumption for unconstrained
low-income earners. Both thus increase the upward jumps in consumption that come
with positive income shocks. Negative income shocks, on the other hand, never lead to
large falls in consumption as shown above, so their contribution to the contemporaneous
comovement of consumption and income is limited.
The simple economy is useful to gain intuition on consumption insurance with limited
commitment, and allows us to arrive at closed-form partial equilibrium expressions.
In order to see wether limited commitment to complete contracts is able to deliver
consumption-income comovements roughly in line with the data, however, we have to
compute the general equilibrium of a model properly calibrated to the US economy.
4I assume that the truncation of the geometric consumption distribution at minimum income is
negligible. With truncation, the true coecient e bcy has bounds that depend on the size of the last,
constrained step, and can be expressed as a function of the untruncated coecient bcy as
bcy(1  
q




) < e bcy =< bcy(1  
q
m(1 + (m)(1   q))
2   q
) (4.12)
where m denotes the maximum number of steps on a decreasing consumption path until an individual
becomes constrained at low income.
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4.3 Partial insurance in a limited commitment model cal-
ibrated to the US economy
This section calculates the partial insurance coecients from equation (4.2) in a version
of the limited commitment model with capital that is calibrated to the US economy,
including a realistic income process with both near-permanent and transitory shocks.
My rst aim is to assess wether the limited commitment economy can deliver realistic
degrees of income-consumption comovement. But since the model identies all shocks,
which in the data are unobserved, the quantitative analysis also allows me to compare
the true population coecients to those that result from the BPP identication scheme
in (4.5). And nally, it enables me to assess the BPP conjecture that an increase in
income variability should, via a stronger threat of nancial exclusion, result in stronger
insurance coecients.
4.3.1 A calibration of the model to the US economy
My calibration is largely based on that by Krueger and Perri (2006), although I allow for
some heterogeneity in preferences, where individuals dier in their degree of patience, as
for example in Krusell and Smith (1998). For incomes, I use the Krueger and Perri (2006)
specication of the individual income process, which includes deterministic heterogeneity
plus both very persistent and completely transitory shocks, of time-varying variance. In
particular, they assume the log of post tax labour income plus transfers (LEA+) mi;t to
be the sum of a group specic component t and an idiosyncratic part yi;t. The latter,
in turn, is the sum of a persistent AR(1) process zi;t, with persistence parameter , plus
a completely transitory component "i;t.
The process for LEA+ is thus of the form
mi;t = t + yi;t
yi;t = zi;t + "i;t
zi;t = zi;t 1 + i;t (4.13)
where " and  are normal, mean-zero shocks with time-varying variances 2
";t and 2
;t
respectively. Using data from the CEX, the authors rst partial out the group-specic
component t as a function of education and other variables, identifying the variance of
the idiosyncratic part of income yi;t, as well as (from the short panel dimension of the
CES) its rst order autocorrelation.
To identify 2
 and 2
", Krueger and Perri (2006) assume  = 0:9989, the value estimated
by Storesletten et al (2004). The estimates show an increase in the variance of both
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persistent and transitory shocks over their sample period 1980 to 2003, with 2
;t rising
from 0:19 to 0:26, and 2
";t from 0:074 to 0:12.
For preferences, I choose a CRRA utility function with coecient of relative risk aversion
of 1 (log-preferences). In a baseline scenario I choose a common discount factor for all
agents, equal to 0:96. But I also analyse a case with some heterogeneity in s. Rather
than calibrating the distribution of s to BPP's estimates, I show that introduction of
a limited degree of preference heterogeneity can deliver partial insurance coecients in
line with BPP's estimates. Particularly, I assume that discount factors are uniformly
distributed on f0:90;0:92;0:94;0:96;0:98g.
In order to capture the features of the US economy adequatly, I allow agents to save at
the equilibrium interest rate after default, and introduce production in the economy. In
particular, I assume that competitive rms hire capital and labour from households to
operate a Cobb-Douglas technology
Y = AKL1  (4.14)
and set the labour share  to 0.3. The rest of the calibration follows Krueger and Perri
(2006), who choose the depreciation rate of capital  and total factor productvity A
to target a capital-output ratio of 2.6 and an interest rate of 4 percent in the baseline
calibration without preference heterogeneity for the year 1980. The corresponding values
of A and  are 0:9637 and 0:0754 respectively.5
4.3.2 The BPP coecients
Chapter 3 derives the joint distribution of consumption and persistent as well as tran-
sitory shocks in the calibrated limited commitment economy described in the previous
section. On the basis of this, we can calculate the linear association in (4.2) directly
















t with their es-
timates on the basis of the BPP identication scheme, BPP
t ;'BPP
t , which are only
identical under assumptions (4.3) and (4.4) and with truely permanent shocks.
5To solve the model, I rst approximate the persistent process for mt with a 7-state Markov chain
using the standard Tauchen and Hussey (1999) method. Following Krueger and Perri (2006) I choose a
binary process for the transitory shock. The computational algorithm then follows chapter 3, where I
describe a very simple recursion that derives the stationary consumption distribution using only partic-
ipation constraints and the law of motion (4.10).
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Table 4.1: The BPP coecients
Variances of income shocks
1980 2003
V ar(mt) 0.19 0.26
V ar("t) 0.074 0.12
BPP coecients
Baseline Preference Heterogeneity
1980 2003 1980 2003
BPP
t 0.021 0.028 0.41 0.36
'BPP
t 0.0078 0.0093 0.131 0.109

pop
t 0.0125 0.016 0.20 0.18
'
pop
t 0.0063 0.0078 0.126 0.104
The table presents the coecients of equation (4.2) calculated from the exact stationary distribu-




t ), and those estimated using the BPP identication
scheme based on covariances between consumption and total income (BPP
t ;'BPP
t ), for both
the baseline economy and that with preference heterogeneity. For reference, it also presents the
variances of persistent (mt) and transitory shocks ("t) in the Krueger and Perri (2006) calibra-
tion.




t together with the
estimates from BPP's identication scheme BPP
t ;'BPP
t , for both calibrations, and the
years 1980 and 2003, the endpoints of the Krueger and Perri (2006) sample. The rst
important thing to note is that, in the baseline case without preference heterogeneity, all
coecients are small, at values below 0.05. Particularly, the values of BPP
t , the coe-
cient measuring partial insurance against near-permanent shocks, are much smaller than
the preferred BPP estimate of 0:65. In line with the BPP estimates and economic intu-
ition, insurance against transitory shocks is even stronger than that against permanent
shocks. However, there is a substantial upward bias in the BPP estimate of responses to
permanent income shocks, as BPP
t exceeds 
pop
t by about 75 percent. A later section
examines the source of this bias more closely.
Figure 4.2 plots the tted values from the linear model, using BPP
t ;'BPP
t , alongside the
joint distribution of consumption and income growth . Particularly, the gure presents
the histogramme density estimate of the joint distribution of consumption and income
growth by plotting black dots proportional in size to frequency mass. It is obvious
that negative income shocks always come with small consumption declines, but positive
shocks occasionally cause large upward jumps in consumption. The tted values from
the BPP model, as red dots, although only approximately linear in total income growth,
understate the response of consumption to positive income shocks, and overstate that
to negative shocks.
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Figure 4.2: The joint distribution of consumption and income in the baseline economy,
and that predicted by the linear BPP model.
The black dots are proportional to the frequency mass in the joint density of income growth
and consumption growth in the baseline calibration of the limited commitment model. The
values predicted by BPP's linear model are depicted as red dots.
4.3.3 The role of preference heterogeneity: micro-founding the spenders-
savers theory of consumption
The baseline results were derived assuming a common discount factor for all individ-
uals. Interestingly, once we introduce a small degree of heterogeneity in discount-
ing, the results change substantially: assuming a uniform distribution of betas on
f0:90;0:92;0:94;0:96;0:98g increases the estimated coecients by a factor of between
10 and 20. Particularly, using the BPP identication scheme, the coecient measuring
partial insurance against near-permanent shocks, BPP
t , is estimated to be 0:36 in 2003.
This is still lower than BPP's preferred value of 0:65. But, incidentally, it coincides with
their estimate on the sub-sample of households with college-educated heads of 0:37. Im-
portantly, the bias in the BPP identication remains unchanged, with estimates about
twice as high as the true value.
The intuition behind this important role of preference heterogeneity in a limited com-
mitment economy is straightforward. From the previous section, it is clear that the
volatility of consumption, and its comovement with income, crucially depend on the
dierence between individual rates of time preference and interest rates. Impatient
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individuals, with low discount factors, prefer consumption today over future consump-
tion. Participation constraints, however, put a limit on this front-loading by requiring a
minimum amount of wealth in certain states of the world. But with low interest rates,
previously constrained individuals reduce consumption relatively quickly after a negative
income shock as the intertemporal terms of trade make future consumption relatively
expensive. This leads to quick falls of consumption in low-income periods and relatively
steep rises once participation constraints bind, resulting in larger consumption volatility
for more impatient individuals at any given interest rate. In stationary equilibrium, the
few very patient individuals in the economy, however, are not only perfectly insured
against shocks, but they also hold a large fraction of aggregate wealth. They are thus
the \savers" that practically set the interest rate, at a level R = 1
0:98. This reduction in
the interest rate raises the volatility in consumption that the remaining \spenders" are
willing to accept further, thus increasing the average comovement between income and
consumption in the economy. Therefore, the limited commitment model with preference
heterogeneity can be seen, in some sense, as a possible micro-foundation to Gregory
Mankiw's \Saver-Spender Theory of Consumption" (Mankiw 2000).
4.3.4 The bias in the BPP idencation scheme
Table 1.1 reveals a striking dierence between the true population coecients and their
counterparts estimated by the BPP identication for permanent shocks. The BPP iden-
tication systematically overstates the coecients, or understates the extent of insurance
against permanent shocks. In 2003, for example, BPP is 75 percent bigger than pop
in the baseline case.
It turns out that there is a simple intuition behind this upward bias of the BPP
coecients in a limited commitment economy. This is because, with history depen-
dence of consumption, the rst of the BPP orthorgonality assumptions (4.3) fails, and
cov(ci;t;i;t 1) is usually positive. This is because history dependence spreads negative
income shocks across a number of periods of declining consumption. So there is positive
comovement between income declines yesterday and consumption declines today. Pos-
itive income shocks, on the other hand, lead to upward jumps in consumption in the
same period, and imply no history dependence. The net eect is for cov(ci;t;i;t 1) to
be positive, and stronger for more persistent shocks, where history dependence plays a
more prominent role.
When shocks are less than permanent, it turns out that this positive covariance between
past shocks and current consumption movements due to history dependence is at least
partly oset by mean reversion in income. This is because unless shocks are permanent,
a negative shock yesterday increases the likelihood of positive income growth today.
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Since current income and consumption growth are correlated positively this leads to a
negative bias in the coecients.
In our simple example with a 2 state Markov process, both the positive bias from history
dependence and the negative bias due to mean reversion, are easily quantiable. Par-
ticularly, the covariance of income growth yesterday with today's consumption growth
is given by
cov(ct;zt 1) = q(1   p)   (1   p)(1   q) (4.16)
where hats denote logarithms and  =  
b +b R
 ( b zh   b zl) > 0. The second term, (1  
p)(1   q), captures mean reversion and vanishes when persistence goes to 1. The rst
term, vq(1   p), is equal to the mass of individuals who remain at low income today
after a negative income shock yesterday. It is exactly for these individuals that history
dependence introduces positive comovement between yesterday's income growth and
consumption growth today. If q+ 1
2p > 1, i.e. for high enough persistence in income, the
history dependence eect dominates, and the aggregate bias is positive. This is true, for
example, whenever p;q > 2
3.
4.3.5 More or less insurance? Rising income risk and the degree of
insurance
When they allow the size of coecients to vary across two sub-periods, BPP estimate
a small rise in both the partial insurance against permanent income shocks and their
variance. They take this as evidence in line with the intuition from limited commitment
models, where higher income variability reduces the attractiveness of nancial autarky
and thus acts as a threat to default. This intuition turns out to be true, but only
for the economy with preference heterogeneity, where the higher variance of income
in 2003 induces a fall in the BPP coecients. The reason for this is fairly simple:
Positive comovement of current income and consumption arises from two sources: rst,
when a positive income shock leads to a binding participation-constraint, increasing
consumption. And second from the fact that all individuals with negative income shocks
have negative drift in consumption. In the baseline case, the fall in interest rates from
4 to 3.85 percent strengthens the second eect suciently to cause a net increase in the
comovement of consumption and income. So the BPP coecients rise. With preference
heterogeneity, the patient consumers pin down the interest rates. So the interest rate
eect is absent, leaving the rise in income volatility to improve insurance by an increased
threat of exclusion, and thus less binding constraints for high income individuals.
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has looked at insurance against income shocks in a limited commitment
economy. Contrary to previous contributions that focused on the stationary cross-
sectional distribution, I compared the comovement of consumption growth with near-
permanent and transitory income shocks in the model to recent evidence on this rela-
tionship in US micro-data provided by Blundell et al (2008). A standard calibration of
the limited commitment model with capital to the US economy implies much stronger
insurance against permanent shocks than observed in the data. But the introduction of
heterogeneity in discount factors increases the comovement of consumption and shocks
to values close to those reported by Blundell et al. In both versions of the model,
however, their identication scheme introduces a strong upward bias in the estimates
relative to the true values, arising from the history dependence of consumption that is
a key feature of the limited commitment model. The model conrmed Blundell et al
(2008)'s intuition, that rising income variance should have increased the insurability of
permanent income shocks, although this depends on the general equilibrium reaction of
interest rates.




Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Existence and uniqueness of a solution to the plan-
ner's problem for a given interest rate R
Result:For every given world interest rate Rmin < R < 1
, there exists a unique alloca-
tion that solves the planner's problem for a particular weighting function  in the social
welfare function.
Proof
I prove the existence of a unique solution to the planner's problem by checking that the
conditions for a simplied version of Proposition 3 in Marcet and Marimon (2009) hold
in this economy.
Given the nite space of individual endowments Z we can apply a version of Tychono's
theorem to see that the Euclidian product ZT is compact for countable T. So the exoge-
nous vector of individual states lies in a compact (Borel) subset of the Euclidian Space
RT. And of course, the discrete transition function satises the Feller property (Assump-
tion A1 in Marcet and Marimon (2009)). Second, given the No-Ponzi condition, for any
given Bt;R;Y the set of feasible consumption allocations ci;t :
R
I ci;t  Y
R 1 + Bt;8t is
just a simplex, so the choice vector lies in a compact and convex set (Assumption A2
in Marcet and Marimon (2009)). Third, note that our objective function is continu-
ous, but unbounded. However, since aggregate resources are bounded each period, so
is
R
I U(c) (Assumption B1 in Marcet and Marimon (2009)). Finally, individual autarky
is incentive compatible and resource feasible. So the constraint set is convex, compact,
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and non-empty.1
Given the continuous objective function, the original sequential problem (1.6) therefore
has a solution. Also, Marcet and Marimon (2009) show that, given any initial weighting
function , these conditions suce to show that an allocation fci;tg;i 2 I;t  0 solves
the original problem if and only if there is a sequence of multipliers 
i;t; i 2 I;t  0 such
that fci;t;
i;tg; i 2 I;t  0 solves the saddle-point functional equation (3.8).
Uniqueness of the solution is assured by the strict concavity of the utility function u.
1Strictly, we have to show that the constraint set has a non-empty interior, or that there is a real
number " > 0, such that
R





i;t)U(ci;t)   W(zi)] > ".
In fact, without knowing the solution of the problem, the existence of " > 0 is not trivial to prove.
However, once we have the solution, the condition is easy to check. For now, I show the existence of "
for the i.i.d. version of the special case, with p = q = 1=2 and Bt+1 = Bt = 0. For this case it is easy to




 , there are numbers
; b " > 0 such that a programme of the form c(yh) = yh ;c(yl) = yh+ b " fullls the conditions above.
Intuitively, the expected discounted gain from higher consumption in future low-income states is large
enough to allow a ressource-feasible reallocation of current consumption from high to low income agents.
Thus the interior of the constraint set is strictly non-empty (Assumption B2 in Marcet and Marimon
(2009)). But, as we will see, this history independent sharing rule is not optimal.




Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Measurement error in foreign assets
The measure of total foreign asset holdings used in the empirical part of this study
potentially suers from at least two kinds of measurement error. First, the responses of
households to questions on their asset holdings are accurate only insofar individuals both
know the accurate dollar value of their assets, and truthfully report it. Since I only look
at portfolio investments (in other words I disregard directly owned foreign companies),
market values of investments are in principle available, and individuals should report
their dollar values at current exchange rates. This may be a strong assumption not only
as individuals might not be aware of up-to-date market values for long-term investments
or exchange rates, but also, for example, if some of them underreport systematically o-
shore investments used to evade tax payments. In the latter case, however, the resulting
measurement error would tend to dilute the correlation between wealth and the foreign
asset share of the portfolio. So a rejection of the Null hypothesis of no relation would
be less likely in the presence of this kind of measurement error. To see this, suppose
all individuals were to invest x percent of their foreign asset holdings in unreported
oshore vehicles. In this case, the dierence between true portfolio shares ] atrue and those
calculated from reported asset holdings can easily be shown to be x
1 x(] atrue)(1   ] atrue)
Thus portfolio shares of foreign assets calculated from individual reports are always
smaller than the true shares, and the dierence is greatest for intermediate portfolios.
As we see foreign asset shares rising from zero to single-digit percentages in Figure 1,
the bias will increase along the wealth distribution.
A second source of measurement error results from the use of average portfolio shares
in the imputation of households' indirect foreign asset holdings via mutual funds. If
rich individuals systematically invest in funds with dierent exposures to foreign assets,
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this might distort the observed wealth eect on total foreign assets. But again, this
error is likely to dampen the observed relationship between wealth and the portfolio
share of foreign assets. To see this, suppose all individuals have the same portfolio
share of mutual funds, but richer individuals choose funds with a higher (lower) share
of foreign assets. Using average mutual fund portfolios introduces measurement error
that is negative for rich (poor) individuals, positive for poor (rich) individuals. This
biases the wealth eect estimated from observed data towards zero. The bias will be
even stronger when richer individuals also have a higher portfolio share of mutual funds.
So again, we would be less likely to reject the null of no wealth eect on portfolios in
the presence of measurement error, than we would be without it.
B.2 Fixed costs and home bias
This section shows that higher costs of investing in foreign assets alone cannot explain
the relative home bias of poorer market participants found in the data. Consider the
2 period problem of a home investor that receives a stochastic share e of aggregate
home endowment YH, and can invest in home bonds at a return RH, or foreign assets,
yielding RF units of foreign currency for bonds and RSYF for shares. Assume e;YH;YF
are independent log-normal random variables. To abstract from the general equilibrium
terms of trade movements at the basis of the results in the main text, assume that the
exchange rate S, dened as the price of foreign currency in units of the home currency,
is simply also a mean zero independent log-normal variable. In addition, assume that
to buy a? units of foreign assets, the investor has to pay a cost of K = k0 + k1a?, i.e.












Subject to the constraints





















where K = 0 if the investor has zero foreign asset holdings.
The problem can be seen as a two-stage decision. First, the investor determines the
optimal portfolios with and without foreign assets; then she compares expected utility
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for both and decides wether or not to hold foreign assets.
For simplicity consider binary portfolios where the investor either invests in shares or
bonds. Given log-normality and independence, and approximating marginal utility from
investing in foreign assets at zero real returns (Rs
F = Rb
F = S0
S = 1), the approximate










where lower case letters denote logs and V ars is the variance of the log exchange rate.






F   k1   rb
H
(V arF + V ars)
(B.4)
So optimal portfolios are a function of risk aversion, excess returns and the variances
of payos. But importantly, they do not include individual wealth. Also, proportional
costs simply show up as a proportionate reduction of returns that aects all portfolios
equally. So portfolio do not change with wealth among participants. Fixed costs on the
other hand mean that only investors with a large enough portfolio diversify into foreign
assets, where for investment in foreign bonds say, the threshold value of total assets is
dened as that for which losses from xed costs exactly oset those from sub-optimal
portfolios
E[u(e0   aRb







F   k1)   k0)] (B.5)
Note that the cost structure assumed in this appendix comprises the case of costly
acquisition of a xed amount of information on any given asset. As information, once
acquired, is non-exclusive in its use, the corresponding cost structure has dierent values
of k0 for dierent foreign assets, and k1 = 0 for all of them. However, the assumption that
costs are linearly ane in the size of investment does not capture a scenario where agents
can acquire additional information on a given asset at non-zero marginal cost. As the
marginal returns to information are increasing in investment size, wealthier individuals
might nd it optimal in this setting to acquire more information. This can induce
variation of portfolios across individuals with dierent wealth levels. However, this
result does not survive when poor agents can pool their foreign investments in a mutual
fund, or if they can copy wealthier individuals' investment strategies.
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B.3 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
In section 3, I showed that the equilibrium relative price of goods is independent of het-
erogeneity and the allocation of assets. As long as agents have some preference for both
goods (0 <  < 1), (2.12) thus describes a non-empty, single-valued mapping from the
two-dimensional space of aggregate endowments into a market-clearing price. In other
words a market-clearing price of goods always exists and is unique for any combination
of YH;YF.
The excess demands for assets are the sum of the quantities solving (2.11), integrated
across the distribution of unconstrained agents in both countries, plus maximum bor-
rowing multiplied by the measure of constrained agents. For example, for Home IOUs,
remembering that these can only be issued by home agents and that asset quantities are






















where e denotes the level of current home endowment share that solves the rst order
condition for borrowing at the maximum level Bb
H.
Under nancial autarky, existence of an equilibrium price vector R = (Rb;Rs
H) is easy
to prove by a xed point argument. Local uniqueness of both consumption allocation
and portfolios can also be shown.
However, global uniqueness is more dicult to prove as individual asset demands are
not necessarily monotone in relative returns. Two special cases where the equilibrium
can be shown to be globally unique are when agents only trade in either bonds, or
shares, but not both, and either   1 (substitution eects dominate income eects) or
B
j
K = 1 (unconstrained issuance of assets). This is because with one asset only, total
excess demand shows no inter-asset substitution eects. Then, for  < 1, all individual
asset demands, and therefore total excess demand for assets, are monotone in returns as
the substitution eect dominates. For  > 1 savers may have decreasing asset demand
(as the income eect dominates). But borrowers' asset demand is always increasing in
returns, with an elasticity higher than that of savers at optimal borrowing levels as long
as everybody faces the same period 2 uncertainty. So if all borrowers are unconstrained
the total excess demand is again upward sloping in returns, and the equilibrium globally
unique. However, even with only one asset, when a lot of borrowers are constrained,
there may be multiple equilibria, as the non-monotonous asset demands of savers can
dominate total excess demand.
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With more than 1 asset, possibly traded across countries, the equilibrium is not gener-
ally globally unique. But conditions for global uniqueness can be derived for example by
imposing the gross substitution property on the system of individuals' arbitrage equa-
tions. For the analysis here this is not a problem, however, as I only look at interior
portfolios, given an equilibrium vector of returns R. I do not solve for the equilibrium
explicitly, which will be a function of the particular specication of distributions and
borrowing constraints in both countries.




Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Proof of Lemma 3.3
The planner's decision rule   has the form
i;t+1 = maxft+1(zi;t+1);i;tg
For every t, t(z) is strictly increasing in z; and for every z, the sequence t(z) increases
strictly over time. Also, the set of individual planner weights with positive mass is strictly
nite: jfj : I(fi : i;t = jg) > 0gj < 1;8t.
Proof
To prove the rst statement write the dierence between continuation values V (i;zi)
and autarky values W(zi) as
t(;zi) : = V (;zi)   W(zi)
u()   zi + Fi
1 X
s=1
sFs 1maxf(ut+s()   u(z));0g (C.1)
where Fi is the ith row of F, u(z) the Nx1 vector of utilities from consuming income,
ut() the constant vector of utility from having planner weight  in period t, and 0
the zero vector.  is thus the discounted sum of \utility in excess of autarky" across
states where individuals are unconstrained, as in all constrained states autarky and
continuation values cancel. It can be interpreted as a measure of insurance benets
promised to individual i. Note that t(t(zi);zi) = 0 denes the minimum participation
compatible planner weight t(zi).
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I rst show (;zj) is strictly increasing in zj, for all . For any 








 ut()   u(zj+1) + Fj+1
1 X
s=1
sFs 1maxf(ut+s()   u(z));0g (C.2)
= t(;zj+1) (C.3)
where the second inequality follows from monotonicity of F, since the vector maxf(ut+s() 
u(z));0g is decreasing in income values. Since t(t(zj);zj) = t(t(zj+1);zj+1) = 0
it follows that t(zj) > t(zj+1).
To see that the sequence t(z) is strictly increasing for every income level z, note rst
that Assumption 1 implies a positive mass of agents with binding participation con-
straints every period, who experience an increase in their planner weights. Given con-
stant resources, any constant i;t+1 = i;t then implies strictly declining consumption
of individual i according to (3.13). Thus, since the autarky value W(zj) is constant
through time, constant or declining cuto values t+1(zj)  t(zj) violate participation
constraints. So t+1(zj) > t(zj).
Finally, to see that the set of individual planner weights with positive mass is strictly
nite, note rst that the minimum participation compatible planner weights t(z) lie




u0(z1) 8t. Since initial planner weights are
strictly positive and nite, the ratio of maximum and minimum planner weights is thus
bounded in all periods. As the sequence of t(zN) is strictly increasing there is an  > 0
such that
t+1(zN)
t(zN) > 1+; 8t. But then the number of periods an individual can remain
unconstrained is strictly bounded by T = min(x 2 N : x >
ln(u0(zN)) ln(u0(z1))
ln(1+) ). Since in
every period there are at most N new weights, the number of planner weights is bounded
by NT plus the number of initial weights K. 
C.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4: The consumption distribu-
tion in the general case
For 1 < R < 1
 the interest rate in stationary equilibrium, the joint distribution of
income and consumption C : C  Z  ! [0;1] has the following features:
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1. C is discrete, with positive mass at consumption values between minimum income
and some upper bound c1




2. There are N minimum levels of consumption ci
0; i = 1;:::;N under which con-
sumption of agents with income i never falls and where participation constraints
at income zi hold with equality. These threshold levels are increasing in income
c1
0 < c2
0 < :::: < cN
0 . The lower bound of the distribution is minimum income
cN
0 = zN.
3. Every consumption threshold ci
0 is an upper bound to a geometric subdistribution
of consumption i
C, with support fci
jg recursively dened by the law of motion
U0(ci
j+1 = RU0(ci
j);j = 0;1;2;:::, and bounded below by zN. C is thus a mixture
of N   1 geometric distributions C;i;i = 1;:::;N   1. The appendix contains an
analytical expression for the frequencies in this distribution.
4. Individuals at the higest income level z1 all have maximum consumption level c1
0.
The support of consumption conditional on income zi;i > 1 is [ci
0;c1
1]. So the sup-
port of consumption narrows as income rises. For i.i.d. transitions (identical rows
in F), this implies that the conditional variance of consumption falls monotonously
in income.
Proof
The proof is by construction of the stationary consumption distribution.
Ad 1-3: The support C
I construct C \bottom-up", starting from its lower bound, which we know to be min-
imum income. Also, from Lemma 1, we know that minimum participation-compatible
levels of consumption ci
0 increase in income zi. Since ci
0 solves the participation con-
strained of individuals at income zi with equality, this allows me to recursively determine
ci
0 by substituting into the ith participation constraint the autarky values at incomes
zj > zi;j = i;i   1;:::;1 for future states with non-negative income shocks, and the
consumption values given by the law of motion (1.11) for unconstrained states. Starting
at i = N  1 and moving up income levels assures that this procedure can keep account
of binding participation constraints as individuals move down in consumption from ci
0
to ZN.
To see this in detail, denote as ci(c;R) the result of applying the law of motion for
unconstrained transitions (1.11) i times starting from level c at interest rate R.
We know cN
0 = ZN. Consider minimum participation-compatible consumption in the
second lowest income state N   1. There, individuals receive cN 1
0 today, the value
of which we want to determine. They face the \danger" of moving, with probability
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fN 1;N, to state N, and thus down to c1(cN 1
0 ;R) tomorrow. With probability fN 1;i,
however, they move to income zi > zN receiving W(i). So cN 1
0 is uniquely determined
from the participation constraint
W(N   1) =
U(cN 1















Here, the second term on the right-hand side of the equation is the value from the declin-
ing consumption path starting at cN 1
0 and truncated at minimum level cN
0 , weighted by
the probability to remain in income state N. The third term is the continuation value
when not receiving a negative income shock tomorrow, the fourth from moving down in
income tomorrow and then receiving positive income shocks at a later date. Note that
the right hand side is increasing in cN 1
0 while the left hand side is constant. So the
solution is unique.
3. Analogously, one can determine the other values ci
0 from repeated application of this
algorithm.
The support of the consumption distribution C is simply the union of downward-sloping
paths starting at minimum participation-compatible consumption
ci
0 C = [N
i=1fmax[cj(ci
0;R);zN];j = 0;1;2;:::g. Note that the highest level of con-
sumption c1
0 is strictly lower than the highest income level zh from assumption A2,
which implies that there is at least one unconstrained transition of individuals at z1
that receive a shock zN, which happens with positive probability. With c1
0  z1 the
participation constraint would thus be slack, as continuation utilities under insurance
are strictly greater than in autarky in at least 1 state of the world. This however cannot
be optimal for the planner, so we have c1
0 < z1.
Ad 3: The frequency distribution on C
I construct the frequency distribution \top-down". From Lemma 1, I know that all high
income individuals are constrained, at the minimum participation-compatible consump-
tion for individuals with the highest income c1
0. Thus, its mass is equal to the stationary
mass of individuals at z1. The rest of the frequency distribution is then based on the
transition probabilities as follows:
Dene i
C to be the subdistribution of consumption that contains all indivduals that
were last constrained at income zi. Out of individuals with highest income last period,
all but those that remain at z1 move down in consumption to c1(c1
0;R), according to the
law of motion (1.11). Denoting the ith row of F as Fi, and dening the Matrix Fi as F
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with the rst i columns and rows replaced by zeros, and disregarding other thresholds






1 on support given by (cn(c1
0;R);z). However, since




ln()ln(R) c periods individuals at income 2 hit their participation
constraint on the downward-sloping path cn(c1
0;R), they drop out of this distribution,
equivalent to F1 shrinking to F2. Equivalent reasoning for lower values of income yields
the following vector valued sequence of joint frequencies on c1












j ;j = 1;:::N;tj = 1;:::Tj (C.6)




ln()ln(R) c the integer number of unconstrained transi-
tions between threshold levels of consumption ck
0 and ck+1
0 . The marginal subdistribution
1
C is simply the the row sum of the expression.
More generally, the joint subdistribution of income and consumption starting at con-
sumption threshold ci
0 with support ci












j ;j = i;:::N;tj = 1;:::Tj (C.7)






n;t(i;i) is the stationary mass of individuals at income
level zi minus those with income zi and consumption above the treashold ci
0.
Ad 4: The conditional distribution of consumption
The strictly positive entries of F ensure that the least upper bound of consumption
by individuals at income zi;i = 2;:::;N is the rst downward step from the threshold
level for z1, c1(c1
0;R) = c1
1. The greatest lower bound of consumption for indivdiuals at
income zi is of course threshold value ci
0, so the minimum interval covering the discrete




with income, the width of the interval decreases.
Monotonicity of transitions ensures that individuals at lower incomes are concentrated
in lower parts of subdistributions, which can be shown to lead to conditional means
that increase in income. Conditional variances on the other hand are non-monotononic.
Assuming i.i.d. uncertainty, however, or identical rows in F, it is evident that Cjzi is
simply Cjzi+1 with a truncated tail, and the tail-mass moved to the truncation point.
This implies conditional variances that decrease monotononously in income values.
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C.3 Proof of Corollary 3.7
With CRRA preferences and 2 income values, the following is true:
1. The covariance between income and consumption is positive. The covariances be-
tween income and both nancial returns and wealth are negative.
2. The mean of consumption increases in income. Its conditional variance decreases.
3. If C(cm)  0, the cross-sectional variance of log-consumption in stationary equi-
librium is




where  > 0 is a function of transition probabilities only. If there is a non-negligible
mass at the truncation point, C(cm) > 0, this is an upper bound for the cross-
sectional variance of individual consumption.
Proof
Ad 1: The covariance of income and consumption is given by
E(c   c)(z   z) (C.9)
= (c1   c)(zh   z) +
m X
2
(1   p)qi 1(ci   c)(zl   z) (C.10)
= (c1   c)[(zh   z)   (zl   z)] (C.11)
= (c1   c)[zh   zl] > 0 (C.12)
where c is the mean of consumption, and the second equality imposes market clearing
Pm
2 (1   p)qi 1(ci   c) =  (c1   c).
To see the second statement, note that the joint distribution of nancial returns and
income is yfin;z : B([c1   zh;c1   zl])  fzl;zhg  ! [0;1] is given by
(yfin;1;zh) =
1   q
2   q   p
: =  (C.13)





(;) = 0 otherwise (C.16)
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for
yfin;1 = c1   zh < 0
yfin;i = zl   c1(R)
i
 > 0;1 < i < m
yfin;i = 0 (C.17)
where B(I) denotes the Borel sets on interval I. So high income agents have strictly
negative nancial income, while individuals with low income have non-negative nancial
income. This of course implies negative covariance, equal to
E(yfin   yfin)(z   z) (C.18)
(c1   zh)(zh   z) +
m X
2
(1   p)qi 1(ci   zl)(zl   z) (C.19)
 (c1   zh)(zh   z) < 0 (C.20)
where the last line follows from (ci   zl)(zl   z)  0; 8i > 1 The joint distribution of
nancial wealth and income W : R  fzl;zhg  ! [0;1] has the same frequencies as
























R(R   q   p)   (1   q   p)
[c1
















zl   zh] (C.24)
The covariance of income and nancial wealth is given by
E(A   A)(z   z) (C.25)
= (A1)(zh   z) +
m X
2
(1   p)qi 1(Ai)(zl   z) (C.26)
= (zh   z)(A1)   (zl   z)(A1) (C.27)
= (zh   zl)(A1) (C.28)
< 0 (C.29)
where the third line exploits the fact that nancial wealth sums to zero across individuals.
Ad 2: Both statements follow immediately from the fact that high-income individuals
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are located at a mass point on the upper bound of the consumption support.
Ad 3:
1. Denote the rst entry of the normalised left eigenvector of transition matrix F
associated with a unit eigenvalue as  =
(1 q)
(2 q p), and the log of x as b x.
2. The mean of logc is






i + b ch]qi 1g (C.30)
= b ch +
1   p




3. The variance is
V ARc = 
(1   p)2



















(1   q)2(2   q   p)2 (C.34)
+(1   p)[
(1 + q)
(1   q)3   2
(1   p)
(1   q)3(2   q   p)
+
(1   p)2






(1   q)3(2   q   p)
+
(1   p)(1 + q)




]2(1   p)(1 + q(1   p   q))
(1   q)2(2   p   q)2 (C.37)
The more general result for the truncated case with C(cm) > 0 is not dicult, but
algebraically messy, to compute. But note that the variance of an truncated geometric
distribution is stricly lower, and that for the i.i.d. case 1 p = q both the mean and the
variance reduce to those for an ordinary geometric distribution. 
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